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In this Article, Professor Muir identifies problems in the regulation offiduciary
responsibility for both defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans.
She explains how one circuit has misapplied constitutional standing doctrine in
the context of defined benefit plans. She also discusses the implications of that
analysis if it receives widespread acceptance. For defined contribution plans,
Professor Muir examines why plan participants confront obstacles in bringing
claims for fiduciary breach in situations where they have clearly been harmed by
a breach. She ends by suggesting a proposed framework for addressing the
unique challenges posed by making employer stock available as an investment
alternative in a participant-directed defined contribution plan.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In any discussion of reform in the regulation of qualified retirement plans,
one critical set of issues relates to the investment of plan assets. During the last
year, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) insurance program
experienced a net loss of $11.3 billion-a loss greater than five times any
previous one-year loss.1 Underfunding in all employer-sponsored defined benefit
plans now exceeds $300 billion.2 Pension claims to the PBGC in 2002 totaled
more than the combined claims for all prior years.3 Nor have defined contribution
plans escaped the negative effects of the economic downturn. Recent reliable
statistics indicate that average account balances in defined contribution plans
1 Challenges Facing Pension Plan Funding: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Select
Revenue Measures of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 5 (2003)
(testimony of The Honorable Steven A. Kandarian, Executive Director, Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode
=view&id=322.
2Id.
31Id
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decreased during 2001, despite continuing contributions by plan participants. 4
The media is rife with accounts of delayed retirements, and retiree financial stress
due to losses in defined contribution plan accounts.
Many factors, including stock market losses, decreasing interest rates, and
employer insolvencies, have contributed to the current weaknesses in defined
benefit (DB) plan and defined contribution (DC) plan assets. In this Article, I
address a subset of those investment issues that intersects with fiduciary and
related remedial concepts. More specifically, I will focus here on two questions.
First, do the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
19745 (ERISA) fail to provide appropriate incentives for fiduciary compliance,
and, if so, what types of reform are necessary to address those issues? Second,
does professional investment advice have a role to play in participant-directed DC
plans and, if so, how should the regulation of that advice be shaped?
I begin, in Part II, by discussing recent case law that implicates the security of
DB plan funding. By limiting the ability of plan participants and beneficiaries to
bring suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty in DB plans, the Eighth Circuit's
opinion in Harley v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.6 may effectively
insulate numerous instances of fiduciary breach from challenge. The decision
deserves serious consideration because of the constitutional questions it raised
regarding the standing of plan participants and beneficiaries to pursue legal
actions against plan fiduciaries who breach their statutory obligations. In Part III, I
turn to a discussion of a developing issue in the DC plan arena. The issue
provides an interesting counterpoint to Harley because it implicates the ability of
DC plan participants and beneficiaries to enforce the statutory obligations of plan
fiduciaries. In Part IV, I consider the role of professional advice for participants
whose DC plans delegate investment decision making to them. There appears to
be widespread support for the concept of increasing the investment advice
available to plan participants. However, the model by which investment advice
might be provided and how to shape the regulation of such advice deserves
consideration. Finally, in Part V, I close with some general thoughts on reforms to
address regulatory issues that interfere with the optimization of plan investments.
II. DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN ASSET SECuRITY
The key attribute of a DB plan is the promise it makes to plan participants.
The plan establishes a formula by which a participant's benefit will be calculated.
Every DB plan sponsor, in essence, pledges to contribute to the plan at whatever
4 Sarah Holden & Jack VanDerhei, 401k Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and
Loan Activity in 2003, EBRI IssuE BRIEF NUMBER 255, Mar. 2003, at 4 (finding an average
decrease of almost four percent in participant accounts).
5 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 1-4082, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-461 (2000).
6 284 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106 (2003).
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levels are necessary to fund the plan.7  The Internal Revenue
Code8 (IRC) sets out complex mechanisms for calculating minimum and
maximum contribution thresholds that are intended to ensure minimum funding
while precluding overfunding that could result in unacceptably high tax
subsidies.9
A. Assuring Asset Integrity-the Practical and Statutory Framework
Participants benefit when DB plans are funded in excess of their projected
liabilities. The advantages to participants of an overfunded plan can be classified
into two categories. First, a plan that is overfunded at a single point in time is
more likely to be able to meet its long term commitments than a plan that is
minimally funded or underfunded. In some ways it is even misleading to evaluate
the funding of a DB plan on a given date. By their nature, DB plans are
established to pay benefits, often in the form of lifetime annuities,10 to current
employees beginning at some point in the future. From an employee's perspective
then, it is important, but not sufficient, that the plan be well funded at the point the
employee is exchanging work for a blend of current compensation and the
promise of a future benefit from the DB plan. The rational employee also would
value increased certainty that the plan will be sufficiently funded throughout the
period the employee expects to receive benefit payments. A variety of factors
implicate the ongoing funding status of a DB plan: plan sponsor contributions,
investment returns, actuarial assumptions, and fiduciary integrity. And these are
out of the control of the individual employees who will rely on the plans for their
benefits.
The second set of advantages that accrue to participants from an overfunded
defined benefit plan relates to the potential for future benefit increases. Plan
sponsors typically retain the right to amend or terminate their DB plans. 11 Upon
plan termination, excess plan assets may revert to the plan sponsor. 12 During the
early- and mid-1980s, the number and size of such reversions led to public outcry
and, ultimately, congressional action.13 The resulting legislation, which imposes
7 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRuCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW
355-73 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing applicable minimum funding rules).
8 26 U.S.C. § 61 (2000).
9 See Dana M. Muir, Note, Changing the Rules of the Game: Pension Plan Terminations
and Early Retirement Benefits, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1034, 1034 n.4 (1989).
10 MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUAuFIED REIREMENT PLANS § 3.52 (2000 ed.). Spouses also
have rights in determining the form of payment of DB plan benefits. Id. at § 7.16.
1 1 PErER J. WIEDENBECK & RussELL K OSGOOD, EMPLOYEE BENEs app. A at 1274,
app. B at 1313 (1996) (setting forth sample amendment and termination provisions).
12 Id. at 1277.
13 Muir, supra note 9, at 1036-37.
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an excise tax of fifty percent in addition to the distribution being taxed at the
corporation's normal income tax rate, 14 substantially discourages plan sponsors
from pursuing reversions. Thus, while any excess assets in the plan nominally
may belong to the plan sponsor upon reversion, for all practical purposes the
assets are only available to pay benefits to participants and beneficiaries.
Because the relevant IRC rules limit overfunding of DB plans in order to
minimize the costs of the tax subsidy for qualified plans, a plan sponsor may
avoid, and in some cases may even be precluded from, making contributions to a
DB plan that is fully funded. In such a circumstance, the effect of overfunding
redounds to the benefit of the plan sponsor. But, frequently plan participants and
beneficiaries in an overfunded DB plan experience some increase in benefits that
are attributable to the overfunded nature of the plan. Three examples of such
increases in benefits include cost of living increases for retirees, short-term
enhanced window programs, and funding of corollary benefits.
One way plan sponsors have traditionally used plan surpluses to benefit
participants has been through the use of cost of living increases for retirees. The
typical DB plan calculates a participant's benefit as of the date of the participant's
termination from employment. For example, a DB plan might provide for benefits
at age sixty-five of 1.5% per year of service multiplied by the employee's salary
averaged over the final five years of employment. At retirement, an employee
with thirty years of service and a final average salary of $50,000 per year would
be entitled to an age sixty-five pension benefit of $22,500 per year. 15 While a
benefit calculated in part on final pay may provide a substantial income at the
time of retirement, over time the effect of inflation can ravage that benefit. 16 Few
DB plans sponsored by private employers include automatic cost of living
adjustments. 17 Employers do, however, almost always retain discretion over the
terms of DB plans and, as a result, may choose to increase pensions to counter
inflationary effects. 18 While data are not available, it is logical to conclude that a
plan sponsor would be more willing to grant discretionary benefit increases from
an overfunded DB plan than from a plan where increasing the benefit levels
would require the sponsor to make higher contributions to the plan.
14 Regina T. Jefferson, Striking a Balance in the Cash Balance Plan Debate, 49 BUFF. L.
REv. 513, 555 (2001).
15 The calculation is as follows: (1.5% x 30 years of service) x $50,000 final average
salary = $22,500.
16 According to General Accounting Office (GAO) calculations, an average annual
inflation rate of five percent would halve the value of a fixed pension in approximately fourteen
years. Pension COLAs, GAO REPORT GAO/HEHS-95-219R1 (Health, Educ. & Human Servs.
Div.) (Aug. 11, 1995), available at http://161.203.16.4/paprpdfl/155043.pdf.
17 Id. at 7 (stating that "less than 10 percent [of privately-sponsored DB plans] explicitly
provide for automatic COLAs").
18 Id.
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Plan sponsors have also relied upon overfunded DB plans to ease the pain of
workforce reductions. By providing incentives, in the nature of higher benefits
than otherwise offered by the plan, to employees to retire early, an employer can
reduce its workforce while avoiding involuntary layoffs. These enhanced plans
are often known as "window plans"' 9 because they are available only
temporarily--during a "window" of opportunity. Employees who qualify for
window plans may receive credit for more years of service than they actually
worked, a more favorable than normal actuarial age reduction, or other
improvements to their expected benefits. In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, the
Supreme Court confirmed the right of plan sponsors to use plan surpluses to
establish these short-term enhanced retirement incentives. 20 Because downsizing
typically coincides with times of financial pressures at employers, common sense
dictates that the incentivized benefits associated with window programs would
most likely be made available at companies with overfunded DB plans.
Employees, as a group, benefit in a second way from window plans. Those plans
enable employers to reduce their workforces through voluntary retirements
instead of through layoffs. Thus, employees who do not retire through the
window program, but who would have lost their jobs in lieu of the window
program's existence, benefit from the plan.
Finally, plan sponsors have some opportunities to use assets from overfunded
DB plans to provide collateral benefits to plan participants. In March 2003, the
Department of Labor (DOL) issued an advisory opinion to counsel for The
Prudential Insurance Company of America (Prudential), opining that Prudential
could terminate life insurance benefits for its retirees that it had been funding
through use of its general assets and then amend its DB plan to provide similar
life insurance benefits.21 This may not result in a net addition of life insurance
benefits for retirees. But, by relieving Prudential of the need to fund the life
insurance benefits through its general assets and to account for the liabilities on its
financial statements, permitting the DB plan to provide the benefits may have
retained benefits for retirees that otherwise would have been terminated. Another
example of the use of excess DB plan assets to provide collateral benefits occurs
with retiree health accounts. The IRC currently explicitly permits excess assets to
be used to provide retiree health benefits.22
19 Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Hanis, Is Age Discrimination Really Age
Discrimination?: The ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 780, 815 n. 177 (1997);
Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver of ADEA
Rights: The Failure of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1285
(1993); Susan J. Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan Investments in Employer Securities, 35
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 563 n.114 (2002).
20 525 U.S. 432,442 (1999).
21 4A Op. Employee Benefits Security Admin., Dept. of Labor 1 (2003), available at
http:llwww.dol.gov/ebsalregs/aos/ao2003--D4a.html.
22 I.R.C. § 420 (2000).
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Funding levels of DB plans, then, affect both benefit security and the
potential to receive enhanced benefits. On the input side, two primary factors
determine funding levels: plan sponsor contributions and investment returns. The
drafters of ERISA recognized that the large amounts of money held by DB plans
could tempt those charged with the investment of plan assets into various types of
fraud and malfeasance.23 As a result, ERISA sets forth fiduciary standards that
apply to anyone who "exercises any authority or control respecting management
or disposition of [a pension plan's] assets" 24 or who "renders investment advice
for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or
other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so .... "25
Most DB plans have a formal committee of fiduciaries, who are employees of the
plan sponsors, who oversee investment policy and practices. ERISA permits those
fiduciaries to delegate investment selection to professional investment
managers, 26 who also become plan fiduciaries. The delegation, however, must
conform to fiduciary standards of prudence and care, and the fiduciaries retain
fiduciary responsibility to monitor the investment managers.
The statute establishes a broad range of remedies for fiduciary breach and
permits suits by a participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor.27
A court can order a breaching fiduciary to reimburse the plan for any losses
attributable to the fiduciary's breach and to repay gains the fiduciary wrongfully
received.28 The statute makes fiduciaries personally liable for these awards. 29 A
plaintiff may seek removal of a fiduciary, or any other "equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate .... -"30 Awards under these provisions,
however, must run in favor of the plan. 31 Where relief of that sort is not practical,
such as in a situation where a plan has been terminated or the individual who has
been harmed is no longer a plan participant, a second remedial section permits
"other appropriate equitable relief .... -32 This provision, however, is narrower
than it may appear at first glance. In 2002, the Supreme Court held that only relief
23 MICHAEL S. GORDON, SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, THE EMPLOYEE
RETREMENT INCOME SECuRrrY Acr OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 6-25 (1984), reprinted in
JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFrT LAw, 73-83 (2000).24 ERISA § 3(21)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2000).25 ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii) (2000).
26 ERISA § 402(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(3) (2000).
27 ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2000).
28 ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000)(a).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985). For a discussion of
Russell's application to DC plans, see infra Part ILL
32 ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (2000).
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that would typically have been available in equity, including equitable restitution
but not legal restitution, constitutes equitable relief for this purpose.33
B. Standing to Challenge Fiduciary Breach-the Problem
Because of its implications for the security of DB plan assets, it is worth
considering the case of Harley v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.34 in
some detail. A committee of employees of Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing
Co. (3M) oversaw the investment of the company's DB plan assets. 35 There is no
question that this responsibility made the relevant employees plan fiduciaries.
During 1990, the committee decided to invest $20 million in collateralized
mortgage obligations (CMOs) offered by Granite Corporation, a hedge fund.36
The parties offered conflicting evidence about the scope of the analysis and
diligence performed by the fiduciaries both prior to making the investment and in
monitoring the investment.37 It appears, for example, that the committee
discussed the CMO investment for only ten to twenty minutes before approving
it.38 However, Deborah Weiss, who was Manager of Pension Investments, seems
to have read the Private Placement Memorandum for the CMOs and obtained
information from other investment managers about at least some of the potential
problems in investing in CMOs.39
It is without controversy, though, that by early 1994 the entire $20 million
investment became worthless. 40 A class consisting of all plan participants and
beneficiaries filed suit against 3M alleging breach of fiduciary duty in the
selection and monitoring of the Granite investment. 41 The plaintiffs alleged that
losses to the plan totaled $80 million.42 The district court determined, however,
that if the DB plan was overfunded, as 3M claimed, 3M would be entitled to
summary judgment on the basis that the plan had not suffered any loss.43
33 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002).
34 284 F.3d 901 (8th Cit. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106 (2003).
35 Harley v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 898, 901 (D. Minn. 1999), affdon
other grounds, 284 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106 (2003).
36 Harley, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
37 Id. at 901-04.
3 8 Id. at 901.
39 Id. at 901-02.
40 See id. at 903.
41 Harley, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 900, 906. Plaintiffs also claimed that 3M violated its fiduciary
duty by "making and maintaining the investment under circumstances which presented a clear
prohibited transaction." Id. at 909-10. This claim, which was dismissed by the district court, is
not relevant to the analysis in this Article. Id. at 910.
42 1d. at 911.
4 3 Id. at 914-15.
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The court's logic in characterizing an estimated $80 million in principal and
foregone investment returns as not constituting a loss to the plan is a good
example of the misunderstandings that can occur due to the complexity of DB
plan funding and obligations. The district court relied heavily on a misreading of
the Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson.44 In
Hughes, the Court rejected arguments by plaintiff participants and beneficiaries
that Hughes had violated its fiduciary duty by using DB plan assets to fund early
retirement window benefits during a downsizing.45 The Supreme Court stated
that "no plan member has a claim to any particular asset that composes a part of
the plan's general asset pool."146 Instead, individual DB plan members are only
entitled to receive the benefits actually promised to them by the plan.47 In Harley,
the district court reasoned that, so long as the plan had surplus assets, the
fiduciary's investment in the Granite CMOs could not cause loss to the plan.48
The court called any existing surplus in the plan a "purely gratuitous [act] on
3M's part."49 After all, 3M had the right to cease contributions to the plan so long
as a surplus existed,50 but instead, 3M had elected to contribute over $400 million
between the time of the loss of the Granite investment and 1996. 51
The Eighth Circuit, however, properly decided that the district court's
holding that the total write-off of the Granite investment did not cause loss to the
plan was "contrary to the plain meaning of [ERISA]." '52 After all, the section of
ERISA titled "Liability for breach of fiduciary duty" describes a fiduciary as
being "personally liable to make good to [the] plan any losses to the plan resulting
from [a] breach" 53 of fiduciary duty. The Eighth Circuit, regrettably though, then
proceeded to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims by narrowly interpreting ERISA's
remedial provisions to avoid what it viewed as "serious Article III case or
controversy concerns. '54
The Constitution permits federal courts to address only "Cases" or
"Controversies. '55 Professor Tribe summarizes the basic principle of standing
doctrine as follows:
44 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
45 For a discussion of those kinds of short-term benefit programs, see supra text
accompanying note 20.
46 525 U.S. at 440.
47 Id. at 440-41.
4 8 Harley, 284 F.3d at 914.
49 Id.
50 ld.
5 1 Id. at 904 n.10.
52 Id. at 905.
53 ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000) (emphasis added).
54 Harley, 284 F.3d at 906.
55 U.S. CONST. art. M, § 2.
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To satisfy the "case" or "controversy" requirement of Article I, which is the
"irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing, a plaintiff must, generally
speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered "injury in fact," that the injury is
"fairly traceable" to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be
redressed by a favorable decision. 56
In a divided decision, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Harley plaintiffs had
not suffered any injury in fact and thus would not meet the constitutional
minimum for standing. 57 This analysis flowed from the court's limited
consideration of the scope of the rights that accrue to participant and beneficiaries
in DB plans.
In discussing participant and beneficiary rights, the Eighth Circuit looked
only to Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 58 where the Supreme Court determined
that particular subsets of participants and beneficiaries could not challenge the
plan sponsor's use of surplus plan assets to benefit other subsets of participants
and beneficiaries. 59 Reasoning that an overfunded DB plan would be able to pay
all of the benefits promised to the plaintiffs under the current terms of the DB
plan, the Eight Circuit determined that only 3M, as plan sponsor, would suffer
loss from any fiduciary breach that had occurred in the making or monitoring of
the Granite investment.60 In order to avoid conflict with what it viewed as a
constitutional limitation, the Eighth Circuit construed ERISA's relevant remedial
provision as precluding the plaintiffs' action.6 1 The court supported this
determination by opining that the alleged breach of fiduciary duty did not
interfere with ERISA's primary purpose of protecting the pension rights of
56 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEpIcAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW § 3-14, at 386 (3d ed. 2000)
(citations omitted).
57 Harley, 284 F.3d at 906.
58 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
59 Id. at 441-42.
60 Harley, 284 F.3d at 905. The Eighth Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claims alleging violation of ERISA's prohibited transactions provisions. Id at 909.
Furthermore, the circuit court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against the individual
members of the plan's investment committee on the basis that those claims were collaterally
estopped by the decision on the claims against 3M. Id
61 That provision provides, in relevant part: "[a] civil action may be brought-... (2) by
the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under § 409."
ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2000). Section 409 sets out the broad scope of
liability faced by a fiduciary who breaches ERISA's standards. See supra text accompanying
notes 27-31. ERISA's remedial provisions have generated a substantial scholarly literature. See
Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer's Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary
Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L 391 (2000) (arguing for a broad reading of ERISA's remedial
provision); Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81
IowA L. REv. 1 (1995) (evaluating the import of Supreme Court doctrine for availability of
ERISA remedies).
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individual participants and beneficiaries. 62 Again, in considering the rights of
those individuals, the court appears only to have considered their rights to receive
the benefits promised under the current plan terms.63
The Eight Circuit's decision in Harley dramatically undercuts ERISA's
protection of DB plan assets from fiduciary breach. Under the Harley court's
logic, the only plaintiffs that could seek redress for breach of fiduciary duty owed
to an overfunded DB plan are the Secretary of Labor and plan fiduciaries. 64 The
DOL successfully pursues numerous cases of fiduciary malfeasance each year,65
but like all government agencies, it operates with severely constrained resources.
DOL cannot possibly police the more than three million plan sponsors and other
members of the benefits plan community that provide benefits to more than 200
million plan participants and beneficiaries across a broad range of pension, health
care, life insurance, and other types of employee benefit plans66 without the
possibility of suits by private parties to enforce ERISA's standards.67
Nor will the theoretical possibility of suits by plan fiduciaries sufficiently
deter fiduciary wrongdoing. Consider the facts of the Harley case. Two categories
of fiduciaries exist. One category consists of the plan sponsor, 3M, and its
employees who act as fiduciaries. As the alleged wrongdoers vis-h-vis the DB
plan, there is essentially zero likelihood that these fiduciaries will bring suit
against themselves for fiduciary breach. The second category of fiduciaries for the
3M DB plan consists of outside service providers to the plan. Again, the
likelihood that any of these entities would bring suit against the very fiduciaries
who award them business and monitor their performance is nil. So, the import of
the Harley decision is that most fiduciaries who breach their statutory obligations
to overfunded DB plans would be effectively immunized from liability. The next
Section considers the intersection of the Supreme Court's standing doctrine,
which "has for some time been one of the most criticized aspects of constitutional
6 2 Harley, 284 F.3d at 907.
63 Id.
64 See ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1 132(a)(2) (2000) (permitting suit by the Secretary
of Labor and fiduciaries as well as by participants and beneficiaries).
65 In fiscal year 2002, the Department of Labor closed 1985 investigations into fiduciary
breaches and prohibited transactions that resulted in some actions to protect plan benefits.
Department of Labor, DOL Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2002, Report on Performance and
Accountability, available at http:llwww.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/aparjfy2OO2.html.
66 See About the Employee Benefits Protection Administration, an agency of the
Department of Labor, available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsalmain.html (setting forth
statistical data on plans and participants).
67 See Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants' Petition
for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1, Harley v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 284 F.3d
901 (8th Cir. 2002) ("If allowed to stand, the panel's holding that a participant in an over-
funded defined benefit pension plan does not have standing to bring suit for breach of fiduciary
duty will create an enormous burden for the Secretary as the only person with standing to bring
such suits.").
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law,"68 with ERISA, which regulates DB plans and has been called "one of the
most complex laws ever enacted by Congress."69
C. Standing to Challenge Fiduciary Breach-Constitutional Analysis
The question of whether participants and beneficiaries in overfunded DB
plans have constitutional standing to sue fiduciaries who breach their obligation to
the plans can be best considered in the larger context of standing doctrine. I begin
this subsection, then, with a discussion of the way in which the Supreme Court's
standing jurisprudence has developed into a mechanism to protect the separation
of powers. Once that approach is properly understood, it becomes clear that cases
between private parties-such as cases brought by pension plan participants and
beneficiaries against plan fiduciaries-do not raise the same concerns as do the
body of cases that makes up the core of the Court's recent standing jurisprudence
and involves claims by a private party alleging that government action is
unconstitutional. Bearing that foundational principle in mind, I turn next to an
evaluation of whether participants and beneficiaries in cases such as Harley do
suffer injury in fact when a breaching fiduciary's actions cause loss to an
underfunded DB plan. Finally, I consider, in the alternative, whether participants
and beneficiaries may bring such suits under the theory of representational
standing.
1. Standing Doctrine
Until the mid-1960's, standing jurisprudence barely made the Supreme
Court's radar screen. The Court decided only eight Article 11 standing cases prior
to 1966.70 During the past twenty-five years, however, the Court has more than
made up for its early lack of doctrinal elaboration in this area.71
Numerous commentators have offered discourses on the historical
development of standing doctrine. 72 In 1992, Professor Cass Sunstein wrote one
particularly thoughtful and oft-cited account that describes five phases in the
68 TRIBE, supra note 56, at 390.
69 Paul J. Fassar, Jr., The New Pension Law, 28 PRoc. N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 59 (1975);
see also Mertens v. Hewitt Ass'n, 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (calling ERISA "an enormously
complex and detailed statute").
70 See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and
Article ll, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 169 (1992).
71 See id.
72 See Tracey E. George & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Constitutional Law: How is
Constitutional Law Made?, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1265, 1280-84 (2002); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing
to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265 (1961); Richard S. Pierce,
Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1763-75 (1999); Maxwell L. Steams,
Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995).
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Supreme Court's approach to standing jurisprudence.73 The first phase was the
longest and lasted from the signing of the Constitution to approximately 1920.74
During this period Congress enacted both qui tam actions and informers'
actions.75 Though the Framers provided almost no elucidation of their view of the
"case or controversy" clause, both congressional action 76 and British legal
precedent 77 indicate an intent to enable citizens to enforce legally recognized
rights. In Professor Sunstein's words, "The relevant practices suggest not that
everyone has standing, nor that Article III allows standing for all injuries, but
instead something far simpler and less exotic: people have standing if the law has
granted them a right to bring suit. s7 8
The second step, and the Court's first real consideration of Article 11
standing, occurred during the progressive and New Deal periods.79 In the relevant
cases, where citizens challenged regulatory legislation as unconstitutional, the
Court decided that the citizens had no personal stake in the lawsuits and, thus, no
standing. 80 But, this was hardly inconsistent with the long and well-established
history of individuals' abilities to enforce their own legal rights. In fact, "the
Supreme Court [wrote] as late as 1939 that, to have standing, a plaintiff must have
a 'legal right-one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against
tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.' "81 The
distinguishing basis was that none of these legal rights existed in the cases of
citizens asking the courts to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional.
The 1949 enactment of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) led to the
development of the third phase in standing jurisprudence. The APA contains its
own provisions permitting individuals to seek administrative review.8 2 Professor
Sunstein argues that Congress intended to capture the existing case law definition
of standing and permit private plaintiffs to bring three categories of cases.83 For
present purposes, it is only important to understand that the APA provided
standing for people who had legal interests that arose either under the APA or
under other statutes. 84
73 Sunstein, supra note 70, at 168-69.
74 Id. at 170.
75 Id. at 175-76.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 171-73.
78 Id. at 177.
79 Sunstein, supra note 70, at 179.
80 Id. at 180.
81 Id. at 181 (quoting Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939)).
82 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
83 Sunstein, supra note 70, at 181.
84 Id. at 181-82.
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Fourth, Professor Sunstein writes that the Supreme Court's decision in
Association of Data Processing Organizations v. Camp85 marked a shift in the
concept of standing because the "Court essentially jettisoned the entire framework
of the APA, even as it purported to interpret that very statute."' 86 The requirement
of an "injury in fact," which proved the downfall of the Harley plaintiffs, 87 frst
appeared in the Data Processing decision.88 Given the factual context of the
decision, the language of the APA, and the tenuous relationship between an
"injury in fact" requirement and Article III's language and earlier jurisprudence, 89
standing doctrine could have broken into two clear strands at this point.
Instead, in its fifth phase the Court has continued its use of the "injury in fact"
language while shifting its underlying focus to a judicial concern with
maintaining separation of powers. Professor Sunstein traces this focus, in part, to
a 1983 law review essay authored by Justice Scalia prior to his being confirmed
as a Supreme Court Justice.90 Justice Scalia's concern was two-fold. First, he
worried that unlimited standing would damage the separation of powers by
permitting increased opportunity for the federal judiciary to review executive
actions. 91 Second, prompt access to the court system would provide challengers
of executive actions quicker review than would use of the democratic electoral
system, thus undermining the democratic process.92 At least up through the 1992
publication date of Professor Sunstein's article, this reliance on separation of
powers concerns to inform standing doctrine culminated in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,93 where Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion.
In Lujan, the Defenders of Wildlife, an environmental organization,
contended that the Secretary of the Interior's 1986 elimination of the consultation
requirement for United States agencies operating overseas violated the
Endangered Species Act.94 The plaintiffs argued that they had observed habitats
of certain endangered animals in the past and intended in the future to observe
and study the species.95 The Court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because their future intentions to visit the habitats were too ill-defined to meet the
85 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
86 Sunstein, supra note 70, at 185.
87 See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
88 397 U.S. at 152.
89 See Sunstein, supra note 70, at 186.
90 Id. at 215. Justice Scalia's article can be found at: Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881
(1983).
91 Sunstein, supra note 70, at 215.
92 Id.
93 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
94 Id. at 558.
95 Id. at 563-64.
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"injury in fact" requirement.96 Plaintiffs were no different from any other citizen
who might wish to observe these animals in their native habitats and their" 'some
day' intentions" did not show "actual or imminent" injury.97 A concurrence by
Justice Kennedy, which Justice Souter joined, noted that if the plaintiffs had made
more definitive plans-such as purchasing transportation, selecting a particular
date of travel, or accessing the habitats on a regular basis-a nexus theory might
have supported standing.98
Two cases decided subsequent to Professor Sunstein's seminal article deserve
mention. The first both reinforces the Court's current approach to standing as one
that is bottomed on a concern to preserve separation of powers by preventing the
Judiciary from intruding on the Executive's power and duty to enforce the laws
and Congress' power to author legislation, and puts that approach in context. In
1997, Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the Court's decision in Raines v. Byrd, 99
which denied standing to members of Congress who wanted to challenge the line-
item veto statute. After strongly emphasizing standing's role in ensuring the
separation of powers, 1°° the Court acknowledged that the doctrine has particular
force in only a limited set of cases: "[Olur standing inquiry has been especially
rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether
an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was
unconstitutional."10 1
In contrast, in its 2000 decision in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States,102 the Court held that the private plaintiff had standing to bring a
claim against his former employer, the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,
under the federal False Claims Act. The Court reaffirmed that its jurisprudence
requires that an individual experience a concrete and particularized injury in order
to have standing. 103 Here, although the plaintiff was acting as an agent of the
United States in making the False Claims Act claim, the Court relied on the
historic acceptance of qui tam actions in this country and in England. 104 At the
same time, though, the Court noted that the plaintiff's right to a portion of the
proceeds resulting from an award in the suit provides a "bounty," and, thus, an
9 6 1d. at 560.
97 Id. at 564. Nor did the plaintiffs meet the ability to redress the requirements of the
standing doctrine. Id. at 568.
98 Ia4an, 504 U.S. at 579.
99 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
100 " 'No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of
government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
controversies.' "Id. at 818 (citation omitted).
101 Id. at 819-20.
102 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
103 1,. at 772-73.
104 Id at 774.
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interest in the outcome of the case.10 5 In dicta, the Court stated that "[i]t would
perhaps suffice to say that the relator here is simply the statutorily designated
agent of the United States, in whose name (as the statute provides...) the suit is
brought .... "106 So, the Court appears, even in its more skeptical modem review
of standing, to preserve the long and well-established view that "people have
standing if the law has granted them a right to bring suit"1 07 even where their role
is simply that of designated agent.
2. Application of Standing Doctrine to DB Plan Suits
The Eighth Circuit's approach to construing ERISA's remedial provisions
misapprehends both the statute and constitutional standing doctrine. First, I
address the Supreme Court's standing doctrine as applied to DB plans. Properly
understood, standing considerations do not require a narrow construction of
participants' and beneficiaries' rights to a forum in the federal courts in cases of
fiduciary breach. Once the mists generated by standing are banished, it becomes
clear that the statute fully provides participants and beneficiaries with the right to
protect their pension plan assets from the malfeasance of fiduciaries who do not
honor their obligations to the plan trust.
A suit brought by private parties-here plan participants and beneficiaries-
against private parties-a plan sponsor and plan fiduciaries-simply does not
implicate the separation of powers concerns that have given rise to the Supreme
Court's enhanced scrutiny of standing in recent decades. In this regard, disputes
where all the litigants are private parties are the polar opposite of cases where a
plaintiff seeks a finding that congressional or executive actions are
unconstitutional. And, the Supreme Court reserves its rigorous scrutiny of
standing for those allegations of unconstitutionality. 108
In contrast, civil actions brought by private parties to enforce their legal rights
have lain at the heart of the Court system's jurisdiction since the earliest days of
this nation. 109 Furthermore, Congress's exercise of its powers to grant legally
protected rights dates to the 1800s.110 Federal court jurisdiction over civil lawsuits
brought to enforce congressionally-granted rights is not only consistent with the
Constitution's standing provision, but such jurisdiction also fully recognizes the
courts' role in providing a forum for the protection of legal rights and, thus,
reinforces separation of powers.
105 Id. at 773.
106 Id. at 772.
107 Supra text accompanying note 78 (quoting Sunstein, supra note 70, at 177).
108 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997).
109 See Sunstein, supra note 70, at 168, 173.
"
0 Id. at 168, 174-75.
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Participants and beneficiaries who bring suit against fiduciaries who breach
their obligation to overfunded DB plans have standing because they suffer injury
in fact.11' Such participants and beneficiaries suffer negative financial effects that
are more than sufficient to meet the Court's injury in fact test. Furthermore,
ERISA grants participants and beneficiaries the right to membership in a plan that
is operated in compliance with the statute's fiduciary standards. When fiduciaries
fail to act in accordance with those standards, they impinge on the participants'
and beneficiaries' legally established rights, giving rise to injury in fact. Either of
those results alone would be sufficient for federal court jurisdiction. It is worth
recognizing, however, that through ERISA's explicit remedial provisions,
Congress explicitly granted participants and beneficiaries the right to bring suit in
a representational capacity to enforce ERISA's fiduciary standards, and the
Supreme Court has specifically recognized that right. The next subsections
elucidate these constitutional principles in the complex area of DB pension plans.
a. Conceptualizing Participant and Beneficiary Rights
The rights of participants and beneficiaries in a DB pension plan can best be
understood by conceptualizing them in the classic formulation of property law,
which views ownership as a bundle of rights.112 Employees exchange their labor
for current salary and a variety of benefits including the bundle of DR plan
rights. 113 The provisions of ERISA and the terms of the DR plan jointly
111 Causation and ability to redress must be present, in addition to injury in fact. See supra
text accompanying note 57. Rarely will these elements of the standing requirement present a
hurdle to plaintiffs in cases of fiduciary breaches against overfunded DB plans.
112 See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) ("The
privilege of use is only one attribute, among many, of the bundle of privileges that make up
property or ownership."); Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival
of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REv. 2158, 2190-91 (2002) (citing Justice
Cardozo's formulation in Henneford as the source of the metaphor); Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J.
Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1229 (1999) (calling the power to
exclude "'one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights.' ")
(citation omitted); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CmI. L. REv. 625, 628 (2002) ("he right
to exclude others is frequently described as the most important stick in the bundle of private
property rights."); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors
for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1446 (2001) (discussing the applicability of
the bundle concept to information control); Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being and the State, 107
HARV. L. REv. 1303, 1326 (1994) (applying the bundle concept to the right to health care);
Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy
in an Era of Trusted Privication, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1228 (referring to the bundle concept
in the context of copyright ownership).
113 Congress accepted the deferred wage theory of pension plans when it passed ERISA.
The Senate report recognized that "losses of pension rights are inequitable, since the pension
contributions previously made on behalf of the employee may have been made in lieu of
additional compensation or some other benefits which he would have received." S. REP. No.
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determine the composition of the bundle of rights possessed by any given
participant or beneficiary. ERISA establishes the minimum size of the bundle, but
that minimum is quite large. The statute assures employees that in exchange for
their labor they will receive a non-forfeitable benefit after a specific number of
years of service, 114 and provides for rights to a variety of information including a
summary of the plan's terms, 115 notification of the plan's funding status, 116
benefit data, 117 notices of changes in plan terms,118 and access in some
circumstances to the complete plan document. 119 Plans must provide internal
mechanisms, including appeal processes, for resolution of disputed benefit
entitlements. 120 ERISA's provisions extend beyond the employee to also provide
independent protections to beneficiaries. For example, plans must provide pre-
retirement survivor annuities for spouses of workers who have vested benefits but
die prior to retirement.121 DB plans typically also must offer retiring workers the
right to receive their pension benefits as a joint and survivor annuity122 in case the
retiree predeceases the spouse, and prohibits the retiring worker from waiving that
annuity except with spousal consent.123 ERISA established the PBGC, and
Title IV of the statute is devoted to the PBGC's program of protections for DB
plans. 124
93-383, at 45 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4930. The remarks of Senator
Harrison Williams, "one of the principal architects of ERISA," lend further support.
Ashenbaugh v. Crucible, Inc., 854 F.2d 1516, 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (Mansmann, J. concurring
and dissenting). He stated that "pensions are not gratuities.... They represent savings which
the worker has earned in the form of deferred payment for his labors." 119 CONG. REc. 29,995,
30,005 (1973).
114 Dana M. Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA's Noninterference Provision, 36 B.C. L.
REV. 201,206-07 (1995) (discussing ERISA's accrual and vesting requirements).
115 ERISA § 102,29 U.S.C. § 1022 (2000).
116 ERISA § 103(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(b)(2) (2000).
117 ERISA § 105, 29 U.S.C. § 1025 (2000).
118 ERISA § 104(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (2000).
119 ERISA § 104(a)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a)(6) (2000).
120 ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2000).
121 ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000); I.R.C. § 401(a)(1 1) (2000). Plans may charge
participants for the cost of the pre-retirement survivor benefit. If a charge is imposed,
participants have the right, with the consent of their spouses, to waive the benefit. 26 C.FR.
§ 1.401(a)-20 Q&A-21 (1989).
122 In an unsubsidized joint and survivor annuity, the benefit otherwise payable to the
retiree is reduced by an actuarially appropriate amount. If the retiree predeceases the spouse, the
spouse continues to receive a reduced benefit for the remainder of the spouse's lifetime. For
more information on joint and survivor annuities and the detailed statutory requirements, see
STEPHEN R. BRUCE, PENSION CLAJmS: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 260-64 (2d ed. 1993).
123 ERISA § 205(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(1) (2000); I.R.C. § 401(a)(1 1) (2000).
124 ERISA §§ 4001-402,29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-461 (2000). The existence of the PBGC and
its guarantee of DB pension benefits does not negate other sticks in the bundle of rights held by
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Furthermore, ERISA sets forth a significant framework of fiduciary
obligations, framing them in terms of traditional trust law standards. Specifically,
provisions require fiduciaries to act "solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and... for the exclusive purpose of: providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries .... ,"125 Fiduciaries must act in accordance
with a general standard of care-that of a prudent person familiar with the benefit
plan matters at issue-in all of their actions including when selecting and
monitoring plan investments. 126 ERISA also specifically requires benefit plan
fiduciaries to minimize the risk of large losses by diversifying plan investments 127
and to act in accordance with plan documents. 128 In addition to the many rights
granted by ERISA, only some of which are surveyed in this paragraph, plans may
provide more benefits to plan participants and beneficiaries.
The result of the statutory framework and plan provisions, then, clearly is not
a situation as the Eighth Circuit seemed to believe, where participants and
beneficiaries have only one entitlement-the ability to receive a specific dollar
payment at some point in the future. Instead, ERISA addresses disparities in
bargaining power and information between employees and employers by
ensuring that when employees exchange their labor for DB pension rights that
they receive a large bundle of property rights in the plan, not just the one paltry
stick recognized by the Eighth Circuit. And, when a plan actor interferes with the
participants' and beneficiaries' property right to any stick in the bundle, that
interference constitutes injury in fact.
b. Participant and Beneficiary Injury in Fact
When participants' and beneficiaries' rights are properly conceptualized as a
bundle of rights it becomes simple to identify injury in fact in cases where
fiduciaries breach their obligations to overfunded pension plans. Each and every
one of the sticks that together represent plan assets are protected by ERISA's
fiduciary provisions. As the Supreme Court recognized in Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Jacobson,129 no individual participant or beneficiary may state a claim to any
specific stick in the asset bundle, regardless of whether those sticks might be
plan participants and beneficiaries. Instead, the PBGC program adds rights to the bundle,
thereby backstopping the employer-based system.
125 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000); see Daniel Fischel &
John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U.
CI. L. REv. 1105, 1108 (1988) ("ERISA's exclusive benefit rule... imports into pension
fiduciary law one of the most fundamental and distinctive principles of trust law, the duty of
loyalty.").
12 6 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
127 See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2000).
128 See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(D) (2000).
129 525 U.S. 432,440 (1999).
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designated somehow as surplus or not surplus. Instead, all of the participants and
beneficiaries together have property rights in all of the sticks that constitute plan
assets.130 And, when plan fiduciaries, in breach of their statutory duties, cause
harm to any of the sticks in that asset bundle, the fiduciaries have caused injury in
fact to the participants' and beneficiaries' legal rights.
This conceptual analysis is consistent with the reality of DB plan operation.
First, as discussed above, 13' well-funded DB plans are more likely than weak
plans to grant increased benefits to retirees, to offer enhanced window plans, or to
provide important supplemental benefits such as life insurance or health care.
This potential for future benefits is one of the sticks in participants' and
beneficiaries' bundle of rights. The potential is no less a property right simply
because it is a right that is contingent on future amendment of a plan.
Second, measurement of a DB plan's assets and liabilities is much more art
than science. On the asset side of the equation, the size of the asset bundle must
be estimated to reflect the market value of assets that may be subject to dramatic
fluctuation (as in the case of some risky financial instruments) or inherently
difficult to value (as in the case of real property and other unique and infrequently
traded assets). On the liability side of the equation, a DB plan's obligations
depend upon a multitude of variables that must be estimated. For example,
workforce turnover, participant longevity, future compensation levels, and age at
retirement all affect a DB plan's liabilities but are incapable of exact prediction.
And, once the plan predicts its future liabilities, it must discount those liabilities to
a present value, once again using an estimate-this time an estimated interest rate.
Because of the complexity in estimating assets and liabilities, ERISA and the IRC
provide plan sponsors with a number of options in determining the sponsor's
minimum and maximum contributions. 132
Contribution obligations and plan funding can change dramatically and
suddenly depending upon economic factors and investment performance. The
statistics on PBGC obligations, set out at the beginning of this Article,133 are one
example of this. 3M's DB plan provides another example. Although it was
overfunded during the 1990s, 134 by the end of 2002 it was underfunded by
approximately $600 million even though 3M had contributed more than $800
million to the plan during the year.135 Given the volatility of plans and the
inability to predict the future financial health of any plan sponsor, a fiduciary
130Id.
131 See supra text accompanying notes 15-22.
132 More stringent rules apply to a terminating plan to ensure sufficient assets exist to pay
participants and beneficiaries their promised benefits.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
134 Harley, 284 F.3d at 904.
135 See News Briefs: 3M Contributes $809 Million to U.S. Pension Plans in 2002, PENS.
& INv., Mar. 17, 2003, at 20.
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breach that causes loss to the plan increases the risk that participants and
beneficiaries will not receive their full benefit entitlements.
That increased risk to participants and beneficiaries is sufficient for injury in
fact. under current Supreme Court standing jurisprudence. In Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 136 the Court considered whether Allan Bakke
lacked standing to bring his challenge to the admissions policies of the Medical
School of the University of California. The allegation was that he lacked standing
because he could not show that he would have been admitted to the Medical
School even if the School had not used race as a criteria in its admissions
decisions. 137 The Court rejected this argument because the School's practice of
settting aside of some seats in the entering class for minority applicants increased
Bakke's risk of not being admitted.138 Similarly, in DB pension plans, the harm a
breaching fiduciary causes to the plan increases the risk that participants and
beneficiaries will not receive their expected benefits. That is all that is required to
meet the constitutional standing requirement.
Third, during the entire life of the plan trust, ERISA requires that fiduciaries
make prudent investments and act solely for the purpose of benefiting participants
and beneficiaries. 139 The extent of any plan overfunding does not affect these
basic fiduciary obligations. 140 No provision of ERISA permits plan sponsors or
fiduciaries to self-deal in assets of overfunded plans, steal assets from those plans,
or gamble away the assets. Only by terminating a DB plan, and fully buying out
all of the participants' and beneficiaries' property rights, which also requires more
than a simple cash pay-out,' 4 ' may a plan sponsor ever gain entitlement to a plan
surplus.
Given all of this uncertainty in asset and liability valuation and in sponsor
contributions, it becomes apparent why Congress required in ERISA that plan
trusts hold all of a pension plan's assets in trust 142 for the exclusive benefit of
participants and beneficiaries. From the perspective of any given participant or
beneficiary it would be terribly dangerous to exchange one's labor for the right to
a future payment from a plan that is funded "just right" at the moment of the
exchange. In a sense, the employee's situation is worse than that of Goldilocks,
136 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978).
137 See id.
138 See id
139 Supra text accompanying notes 125-28.
140 ERISA and the IRC contain overlapping funding provisions. The ERISA provisions
are set forth in a self-contained part-Part 3-of Title I. ERISA §§ 301-08, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1081-86 (2000).
141 To terminate a plan a sponsor must meet disclosure obligations, select an annuity
provider in accordance with fiduciary obligations, and so forth.
14 2 ERISA does permit a few exceptions to the trust requirement, such as an exception for
plan assets held by an insurance company. See ERISA § 403(b)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(2)
(2000).
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who was faced with three bowls of porridge. Who decides if the plan is funded
"just right," and how do they decide? Unlike Goldilocks' ability to taste the
porridge, the employee cannot independently measure the plan's financial status
to ensure it is "just right." What is more, unlike Goldilocks, who, since she
wanted to eat the porridge at the time she tasted it, did not need to seek porridge
that was too hot or too cold currently in order to assure it would be right when it
came time to eat, the employee will not consume plan benefits until many years in
the future. In light of the many risks that inhere in long-term DB plan funding-
risks associated with investment of plan assets, of unexpected demographics or
interest rates affecting plan liabilities, and of the fiscal health of a plan sponsor
affecting its ability to make contributions to the plan-a larger bundle of sticks in
the plan's asset bundle increases the likelihood that the plan will have the ability
to pay benefits to our hypothetical Goldilocks-like employee. And, if the plan
fiduciaries, in breach of their statutory duty cause some of those asset sticks to be
lost, the fiduciaries have impinged on the participants' and beneficiaries' property
rights in a secure pension, causing injury in fact.
Fourth, ERISA grants participants and beneficiaries the legal right to
participate in a DB plan that is free from fiduciary malfeasance. Congressional
hearings prior to ERISA are rife with concerns about the misuse of plan assets.
Senator Ribicoff stated that: "frequently the pension funds themselves are abused
by those responsible for their management who manipulate them for their own
purposes or make poor investments with them."' 143 Representative Perkins
promised that: "[S]ince trustees and managers of plans have not always been
above manipulating or investing funds for their own gain rather than in the
interest of the beneficiary, fiduciary standards are established which will provide
additional safeguards against mismanagement." 144 Senator Williams, one of the
architects of ERISA, said ERISA was intended: "to establish uniform fiduciary
standards to prevent transactions which dissipate or endanger plan assets .... -145
Senator Clark opined that ERISA "sets fiduciary standards to insure that pension
funds are not mismanaged."' 146 In spite of the extensive legislative history
reflecting worries about fiduciary overreaching, not a single statement limits the
concerns to situations where DB plans were overfunded. Instead, as these
comments indicate, legislators focused on providing participants and beneficiaries
143 120 CONG. REc. 29,957 (1974), reprinted in 3 SutBcoMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PuBLIc WELFARE, UNIrED STATES SENATE, 94Tm CONG., LEGIS.
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETiREMENT INCOME SEcuRrrY Acr OF 1974, 4733, 4811 (Comm.
Print 1976) [hereinafter HISTORY].
144 120 CONG. REc. 4278 (1974), reprinted in 2 HISTORY, supra note 143, at 3351, 3370
(Comm. Print 1976).
145 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974), reprinted in 3 HISTORY, supra note 143, at 4733,
4743.
146 120 CONG. REc. 29,961 (1974), reprinted in 3 HISTORY, supra note 143, at 4733,
4823.
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with safeguards against all manner of fiduciary wrongdoing. The Supreme Court
has acknowledged the presence of this particular stick in the bundle of plan rights
held by participants and beneficiaries. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Russell,147 the Court cited many of the foregoing and others in support of
its statement that: "the crucible of congressional concern was misuse and
mismanagement of plan assets by plan administrators and that ERISA was
designed to prevent these abuses in the future."
Congress's focus on fiduciary obligation clearly was informed by the history
of malfeasance in pension plans that had occurred prior to ERISA's enactment. It
is hardly surprising, then, that Congress granted to plan participants and
beneficiaries the right that many commentators view as the most important of all
property rights-the right of exclusion. 148 Among the other remedies available
against breaching fiduciaries, ERISA section 409 explicitly permits plaintiffs to
seek, and courts to grant, "removal of [a breaching] fiduciary."' 149 The resulting
statutory framework grants participants and beneficiaries the legal right to
membership in a DB plan that is free from fiduciary breach and to seek the
removal of fiduciaries who have not fulfilled their obligations to the plan. Thus,
under this regime, where plan fiduciaries violate their statutorily-imposed
obligation of trust, they have, per se, impinged on the participants' and
beneficiaries' legal rights, causing injury in fact.
In sum, a proper understanding of participant and beneficiary rights in a DB
plan accepts that those rights are constituted of far more than just a simple right to
receive a stream of payments at some time in the future. Instead, as participants
and beneficiaries in an ERISA-regulated trust, participants and beneficiaries enjoy
a rich array of legal rights that can best be conceptualized by using the traditional
property law concept of a bundle of rights. The bundle includes, along with many
other rights, a contingent right to increased future benefits should the plan sponsor
choose to grant those benefits or should the employees have sufficient bargaining
strength to negotiate for them, a right held by the entire cohort of participants and
beneficiaries to have all of the plan assets used exclusively for their benefit and
invested prudently, and a right to membership in a plan free of the types of
fiduciary fraud and self-dealing that pre-dated ERISA. Fiduciaries who, through
breach of their statutorily-imposed duty, impinge on any one of these property
rights do cause harm-and, thus, injury in fact, as required by standing doctrine,
147 473 U.S. 134, 140 n.8 (1985); see also Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Salomon Smith
Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 241 (2000) ("Responding to deficiencies in prior law regulating
transactions by plan fiduciaries, Congress enacted ERISA § 406(a)(1), which supplements the
fiduciary's general duty of loyalty to the plan's beneficiaries .... ").
148 See, e.g., Lipsky, Jr. & Sidak, supra note 112, at 1229 (calling the power to exclude
"'one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights.' ") (citation
omitted); Long, supra note 112, at 628 ("'The right to exclude others is frequently described as
the most important stick in the bundle of private property rights.").
149 See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
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to the legal rights of participants and beneficiaries. In a situation, such as occurred
in Harley, where the fiduciary impinged on all of these property rights, the harms
are exponential.
c. Participant and Beneficiary Representational Standing
Though unnecessary given the foregoing analysis, participants and
beneficiaries in cases where fiduciaries breach their duties to overfunded DB
plans would, alternatively, have standing under the concept of representational
standing. Since the earliest days of this country's history, Congress's power to
grant parties the right to bring civil suits in a representational capacity has gone
unquestioned by the federal courts. In fact, the quintessential suits of this type
were suits by private citizens against private citizens. 150 Further, the Eighth
Circuit's notion that a bounty is necessary for a representational action to meet the
constitutional requirements of standing ignores history and misinterprets the
Supreme Court's current jurisprudence. As Professor Sunstein explains, "history
suggests that the bounty is designed to offer an incentive, not to create an injury
where none existed before." 151 Recognition of congressional power to create
representational actions accords with this history and with the respect due to
Congress under separation of powers principles. The Supreme Court
acknowledged the constitutionality of representative actions in its decision in
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States152 when, although
unnecessary given the terms of the statute in question, the Court stated that it
might have been enough for the plaintiff to be "the statutorily designated agent of
the United States, in whose name.. . the suit is brought.. .."
Congress clearly empowered participants and beneficiaries to bring
representational actions for breaches of fiduciary duty. ERISA section 502(a)(2)
grants four categories of plaintiffs the right to bring civil actions for the relief
provided under ERISA section 409: the Secretary of Labor, plan fiduciaries, and
participants and beneficiaries. 153 Section 409 describes the monetary relief
available to redress breaches of fiduciary duty as relief that runs "to the plan."' 154
In the context of a DB plan, the only reasonable construction of these provisions
is the one recognized by the Supreme Court in Russell. There the Court stated that
the statutory language "is indicative of Congress's intent that actions for breach of
fiduciary duty be brought in a representative capacity on behalf of the plan as a
whole."'155 The Supreme Court could hardly have been more clear in recognizing
150 Sunstein, supra note 70, at 176.
151 Id.
152 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000).
153 ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2000).
154 ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
155 Russell, 473 U.S. at 142 n.9.
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that actions seeking relief under the combination of ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and
409, whether brought by the Secretary, a plan fiduciary, or by participants and
beneficiaries, have a representational component. And, recognition of standing for
representational actions provided for by Congress is consistent both with the
history of standing for representational actions, which dates nearly to the signing
of the Constitution, and with the Supreme Court's recent standing jurisprudence.
In sum, constitutional standing considerations do not mandate a cramped
interpretation of ERISA's remedial provisions. In combination, ERISA and DB
plan documents provide plan participants and beneficiaries with a bundle of legal
rights. Fiduciaries that breach their obligations to DB plans will typically impair
some number of the legal rights in the participants' and beneficiaries' bundle.
Those impairments easily meet the low threshold of injury in fact required for
constitutional standing. This is particularly true given that these suits present
themselves as actions by private parties against private parties, and, thus, do not
seek the types of relief against either congressional or executive actions that
require more careful scrutiny of standing to preserve appropriate separation of
powers. Alternatively, participants and beneficiaries have standing to pursue relief
on behalf of their DB pension plan under the concept of representational standing.
Congress clearly used its longstanding power to include representational concepts
in ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and 409.
D. Standing to Challenge Fiduciary Breach-ERISA Analysis
Now that any concerns with constitutional standing have been negated, this
subsection will consider the proper construction of ERISA's remedial provisions
in the context of breaches of duty by fiduciaries of overfunded DB plans. I begin
by recapping the relevant statutory language, which I addressed in large part in
the last subsection. Next, I consider the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence,
which counsels strict adherence to the statutory language. Finally, I consider the
policy ramifications of various constructions of ERISA's remedial provisions.
1. Statutory Provisions
As discussed above,15 6 the relevant statutory provisions in a participant and
beneficiary suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty to a DB pension plan typically
are ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and 409. It is worthwhile, at this point, however, to
step back and consider these provisions in the larger context of ERISA's
extensive regulatory framework. Section 502(a)(2) is one of five provisions in
section 502 that provide participants and beneficiaries with a basis to bring civil
156 Supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
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suits under ERISA. 157 Although the Supreme Court has referred to the civil
remedies provisions as being "carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions"
that exist as part of an "interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial
scheme, which is in turn part of a 'comprehensive and reticulated statute,' "158
significant gaps do exist in the protections extended to plan participants and
beneficiaries, particularly in the health care arena. 159 Section 502's language is
simple and direct-allowing for civil actions "by the Secretary, or by a
participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under [ERISA
§ 409]."160 Section 409 is contained in Title I of ERISA's Part IV, which is
devoted to provisions dealing with "Fiduciary Responsibility."' 161 Structurally,
that Part first sets forth the coverage of the Part and the requirements for written
plan documents and establishment of a formal trust. 162 Then the Part establishes
general fiduciary standards and makes specific provisions regarding issues such
as co-fiduciary liability and prohibited transactions. 163
The third and final set of provisions deals with various aspects of fiduciary
liability, including section 409, which is titled "Liability for breach of fiduciary
duty."' 64 Not surprisingly, given the congressional concern with providing
protection against fiduciary misdeeds,165 section 409's language is cast in very
broad terms. Its language applies to all plans of any type subject to ERISA's
regulation, referring as it does to "a plan," "such plan," and "the plan."' 166 It refers
to "[a]ny person who is a fiduciary," to breaches of "any of the responsibilities,
obligations or duties" imposed by ERISA, to an obligation to make the plan
whole for "any losses," and for restoration to the plan of "any profits."'167 In
157 The other provisions are: ERISA § 502(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (2000)
(permitting suits for plan benefits and to enforce plan rights); ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3) (2000) (permitting suits to enjoin violations of ERISA or the plan and to seek other
appropriate equitable relief); ERISA § 502(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4) (2000) (permitting
suits to enforce informational requirements); ERISA § 502(a)(9), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(9) (2000)
(permitting suits relating to the purchase of annuities to pay plan benefits).
158 Russell, 473 U.S. at 146 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446
U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
159 See Muir, supra note 61, at 391-92 (criticizing ERISA's lack of remedial protection
for plan participants and beneficiaries who suffer harm from health care coverage denials).
160 ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2000).
161 ERISA Title L Part IV, 29 U.S.C. Title I, Part IV (2000).
162 ERISA §§ 401-03, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-03 (2000).
163 ERISA §§ 404-08,29 U.S.C. §§ 1104-08 (2000).
164 ERISA § 409,29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000).
165 Supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
166 ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
167 Id. (emphasis added).
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somewhat inelegant drafting, 168 section 409 also permits courts to award any
"other equitable or remedial relief' 169 and explicitly includes removal of
fiduciaries among the relief that may be granted.170
Consider together the implications of sections 502(a)(2) and 409. Congress
explicitly empowered nearly every party with a significant interest in benefit
plans to bring a civil action for breach of fiduciary duty. And, the scope of the
available remedies explicitly applies to any breaching fiduciaries. The remedies
themselves are limited only by whatever limits exist on the federal courts'
abilities to award equitable or remedial relief. There is no basis whatsoever in this
statutory framework to preclude suits by participants and beneficiaries against
fiduciaries who breach their statutory duties-regardless of whether the plan is a
pension or health care plan, regardless of whether the plan is underfunded,
overfunded, or not funded at all, regardless of the size or contingent nature of the
participants' or beneficiaries' benefits, and regardless of the fiduciary's position
as a plan sponsor, an employee of a plan sponsor, or an outside service provider.
In short, the statutory language makes clear that the many factual intricacies that
deternine the nature of an employee benefit plan simply are not relevant to the
ability of plan participants and beneficiaries to seek relief against breaching
fiduciaries.
2. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
In one of its earliest ERISA decisions, the Supreme Court opened its opinion
by referring to the statute as "comprehensive and reticulated." 171 Since then the
Court has used that phrase eleven times in ERISA cases, 172 typically to support a
decision that hews closely to the statute's language. The Court's approach has
been particularly consistent in cases interpreting ERISA's remedial provisions.
The Court has repeatedly referred to "ERISA's interlocking, interrelated, and
interdependent remedial scheme." 173 On the one hand, this approach has resulted
168 Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 258 n.8 (1993) (terming the language
"artless").
169 ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
170 Id
171 Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980).
172 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002); Harris
Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247 (2000); Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 447 (1999); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 516 (1996);
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107,
113 (1989); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108 (1989); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 214 (1986); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S.
717, 720 (1984); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981).
173 Varity, 516 U.S. at 521; Russell, 473 U.S. at 146; see also Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.
2004]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
in the Court refusing to permit any relief not explicitly provided for in the statute.
For example, the Court has stated that ERISA "should not be supplemented by
extratextual remedies... ,174 And, "ERISA's 'comprehensive and reticulated'
scheme warrants a cautious approach to inferring remedies not expressly
authorized by the text." 175 In the same vein: "The six carefully integrated civil
enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted...
provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies
that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly." 176
On the other hand, the Court has been careful not to disrupt the balance
Congress struck in protecting participant and beneficiary interests177 by
disallowing remedies contained in the statute. In Harris Trust & Savings Bank v.
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,178 the Court refused to immunize nonfiduciaries
from liability for violations of the prohibited transactions provisions. The Court
closely examined the relevant statutory language and found that it "admits of no
limit.., on the universe of possible defendants. Indeed, § 502(a)(3) makes no
mention at all of which parties may be proper defendants-the focus, instead, is
on redressing the 'act or practice which violates any provision of [ERISA Title
fl.' "179
Similarly, in Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railway Co.,180 the Supreme Court rejected an argument that ERISA's
nondiscrimination provision, section 510,181 only protects benefits that are
capable of vesting under the statute. The Court looked at section 510's
unrestricted use of the term "plan" and "any right."1 82 The statutory language
contained no limitation on the types of benefit plans to which section 510 applied,
and the Court refused to add a limitation.1 83
In the context of participant and beneficiary claims alleging fiduciary breach,
section 409's language also "admits of no limit." 184 As explained above, 185 the
v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 376 (2002) (stating "those provisions amounted to an 'interlocking,
interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme' ") (citation omitted).
174 Hughes Aircraft, 525 U.S. at 447.
175 Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 530 U.S. at 247 (citations omitted).
176 Russell, 473 U.S. at 146.
177 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263 ("We will not attempt to adjust the balance between those
competing goals that the text adopted by Congress has struck.").
178 Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 530 U.S. at 251.
17 9 Id. at 246 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
180 520 U.S. 510, 512 (1997).
181 ERISA § 510,29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000).
182 520 U.S. at 514-15.
183 Id. at 516.
184 Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 530 U.S. at 246.
185 Supra text accompanying note 166.
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statute's plain wording refers to: "a plan," "such plan," and "the plan." 186 Well-
established Supreme Court jurisprudence requires that this language be given its
natural breadth, which does not preclude actions against fiduciaries who breach
their obligations to overfunded DB plans.
3. Policy Considerations
In addition to being inconsistent with the statutory language and Supreme
Court jurisprudence, precluding participants and beneficiaries from bringing suit
against fiduciaries who breach their duties to overfunded pension plans raises
serious problems in application. Given the lack of grounding in the statutory
language for such an interpretation, it is unclear what date should be used to
measure the plan's funded status. Nor is it clear what methodology should be
used to determine that status. Furthermore, from a technical perspective the
rationale of such an interpretation would seem to preclude even participants and
beneficiaries in at least some underfunded plans from bringing suit against
breaching fiduciaries that caused or contributed to the underfunding.
The Eighth Circuit did not indicate the appropriate date for measurement of a
plan's funding status for purposes of determining whether participants and
beneficiaries have the right to challenge breaches of fiduciary duty. The court
referred to the overfunded nature of the plan during the period of the Granite
investment and 3M's later voluntary contributions. 187 But, consider a case where
fiduciaries breach their obligations when making an investment and, at the time of
that decision, the plan is overfunded. Should that overfunded status be sufficient
to protect the fiduciaries from suit even if the loss resulting from the breach
causes the plan to be underfunded? Or, if the plan is underfunded when the breach
occurs but is overfunded at a later date when the loss caused by the breach is
realized, are the fiduciaries immunized from liability? Would it matter whether
the plan became overfunded due to investment gains or plan sponsor
contributions? None of these situations present appropriate grounds for protecting
the breaching fiduciaries, but, under the Eighth Circuit's logic in Harley,
participants and beneficiaries may not have standing in any of these cases.
A third scenario is what occurred in Harley. The plan appears to have been
overfunded at the time of the investment and throughout the pendency of the
lawsuit. 188 However, the 3M plan has since become underfunded. 189 Would plan
participants and beneficiaries have standing now to challenge the fiduciaries'
actions with respect to the Granite investment? If so, the participants' and
beneficiaries' ability to enforce their rights to membership in a plan free of
186 ERISA § 409,29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000).
187 Harley, 284 F3d at 904.
188 See id.
189 Supra text accompanying note 135.
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fiduciary breach could depend upon whether the plan became underfunded before
the statute of limitations runs. Such an approach would effectively permit a plan
sponsor to immunize favored fiduciaries by making contributions at levels
sufficient to prevent the plan from becoming underfunded until after the statute of
limitations expires.
One could argue that incenting the plan sponsor in this way would be good
policy because it would help prevent underfunding of DB plans. This argument,
however, misses the key point that pensions represent deferred compensation.
Economic limits constrain employees' entire compensation package. An
employer that contributes to the DB plan to offset fiduciaries' malfeasance will
have fewer compensation and benefit dollars available for salaries and other
benefits.
Nor is it entirely clear from the Eighth Circuit's opinion whether any level of
overfunding is sufficient to negate plan participants' and beneficiaries' right to
bring suit against breaching fiduciaries or whether some minimum amount of
overfunding is required. The court states in summary that: "For these reasons, we
conclude that plaintiffs' failure to investigate and monitor claims were properly
dismissed if the Plan's surplus was sufficiently large that the Granite investment
loss did not cause actual injury to plaintiffs' interests in the Plan." 190 Thus, it is
possible the Eighth Circuit would find that participants and beneficiaries in a less
overfunded plan than the 3M plan would have standing to sue. But, the Eighth
Circuit provides no guidance as to how much overfunding is enough to immunize
breaching fiduciaries.
How to measure plan overfunding is another question that flows from the
Harley decision. ERISA permits plan sponsors to choose among six methods of
funding for accrued benefits or to propose a customized method to the IRS for
approval. 191 Plan sponsors also have substantial discretion in adopting
assumptions, including employee turnover rates, future compensation rates, and
most importantly interest rates, for their plans.192 The interest rate assumptions
are so important that they currently are subject to considerable debate. 193 A plan's
funding status also depends upon whether the calculation is being made assuming
the plan will continue indefinitely or whether it will be terminated
immediately.' 94 If a plan's funded status at a particular point in time determines
whether participants and beneficiaries have the right to challenge fiduciary
190 Harley, 284 F.3d at 907 (emphasis added).
191 LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 7, at 361-63.
192 Id. at 356-57.
193 Challenges Facing Pension Plan Funding: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Select Revenue Measures of the House Ways and Means Comm., 108th Cong. 10 (2003)(testimony of Steven A. Kandarian, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation).
1 9 4 LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 7, at 365.
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breaches, considerable resources will be expended on the expert testimony of
actuaries and other pension funding experts to address these questions.
Consider, as well, the application of the Eighth Circuit's logic to underfunded
DB plans. The court's conclusion indicates that overfunding alone may not be
sufficient to deny participants and beneficiaries standing-instead perhaps the
overfunding must be "sufficiently large" so that a breach of fiduciary duty does
not "cause actual injury to the plaintiffs' interests in the Plan."' 195 But looking to
the court's rationale, it is possible that it could be extended even to underfunded
plans. The Eighth Circuit provided two reasons for its decision. First, permitting
the suit to go forward would raise Article 111 standing issues because the court
failed to recognize injury in fact where the participants and beneficiaries had not
failed to receive any benefits payable by the plan. 196 Second, the court believed
ERISA's protective goals were met because "the ongoing Plan had a substantial
surplus before and after the alleged breach and a financially sound settlor
responsible for making up any future underfunding."' 197
These statements may indicate that the Eighth Circuit believes that
participants and beneficiaries actually have to suffer some loss of benefit
payments in order to obtain standing. If so, that would dramatically limit the types
of cases where participants and beneficiaries could bring suits challenging
breaches of fiduciary duty to DB plans. Pushed to its logical extreme, the court's
rationale would preclude standing where the DB plan is drastically underfunded,
but the breaching fiduciaries convince a fact finder that the plan sponsor has the
financial strength to make up the underfunding. And, even if a plan sponsor does
not have that financial wherewithal, a breaching fiduciary could argue that the
PBGC's guarantees sufficiently protect participants and beneficiaries from losing
benefits except to the extent that the benefits of some individuals may exceed the
PBGC guarantees. But, surely, Congress did not intend, and ERISA's language
does not require, a plan sponsor to default on its plan obligations, the PBGC to
assume responsibility for the plan, and participants and beneficiaries to lose
expected benefits before those participants and beneficiaries gain standing to
bring suit for breach of fiduciary duty.
In sum, the Harley court was wrong. Participants and beneficiaries in DB
plans governed by ERISA enjoy a large bundle of rights. When fiduciaries breach
their statutory obligations to DB plans those breaches will almost always impinge
on some number of the sticks in the participants' and beneficiaries' bundle of
rights. That is sufficient to constitute injury in fact under the Supreme Court's
Article M doctrine. 198 Furthermore, permitting participants and beneficiaries to
195 Harley, 284 F.3d at 907. For a discussion of the import of this language, see supra text
accompanying note 190.
196 Id. at 906-07.
197 Id. at 907.
198 And if, for the sake of argument, the breach is not sufficient to constitute injury in fact,
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bring suit in all cases involving breach of fiduciary duty to a DB plan, regardless
of the plan's funding status or any other factual variable, is consistent with the
statutory language, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on ERISA remedies, and
the goals that under gird pension policy.
mH. FIDucIARY BREACH IN DC PLANS
Plaintiffs who bring claims alleging fiduciary breach in DC plans face a
challenge that is the opposite of the issue for DB plan plaintiffs. The nub of the
issue for plaintiffs who allege fiduciary breach in a DB plan is whether they have
a sufficient individual stake to gain standing under the injury in fact doctrine. 199
In contrast, DC plan plaintiffs face potential challenges that their stake is too
individualized.
When DC plan plaintiffs seek relief under the combination of ERISA
sections 502(a)(2) and 409, their claims must be consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell 200 That decision
was the Court's first major decision on ERISA remedies and it established an
approach to construction of those remedies that focused closely on the statutory
language. The plaintiff, Doris Russell, was a participant in disability plans
sponsored by her employer, Massachusetts Mutual. 201 Russell suffered from back
problems and received benefits for approximately five months.20 2 The disability
committee then terminated her benefits for 132 days, during which period
multiple physicians evaluated Russell's condition. 20 3 During the approximately
four-and-a-half month period when the company withheld her benefits, Russell's
disabled husband was forced to cash in his retirement savings and the stress
further aggravated her back problems.2°4 Russell sought compensatory and
punitive damages from Massachusetts Mutual, asserting that the plan fiduciaries
ignored the medical reports, used incorrect eligibility standards, and purposefully
delayed evaluation of her claim.205 Russell brought her claim under ERISA
sections 502(a)(2) and 409.206
At the Supreme Court, the case presented on the question of whether section
409 authorizes a participant to personally recover "extracontractual compensatory
then participants and beneficiaries would still have the right to bring suit under a theory of
representational standing.
199 See supra Part II.
200 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
201 Id. at 136.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 137.
205 Id. at 136-37.
206 Russell, 473 U.S. at 139 n.5.
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or punitive damages." 207 This issue, though, subsumed two different questions.
First, Russell wanted to personally and directly recover the compensatory and
punitive damages; she did not want the recovery to go to the plan. Second, the
issue raised the question of what types of damages are available under sections
502(a)(2) and 409. The Court ultimately determined that neither punitive nor
compensatory damages are available under these sections.208 For purposes of this
Article, the first question is the more important.
Massachusetts Mutual argued that recovery under sections 502(a)(2) and 409
must "inure[ ] to the benefit of the plan as a whole." 209 The Supreme Court
engaged in an integrated reading of the entire statutory provision and agreed with
Massachusetts Mutual that remedies awarded under section 409 must go to a
benefit plan and not directly to an individual participant or beneficiary.210 It is
critical, however, to understand both the setting of this case and the Supreme
Court's reasoning. Looking to the language of section 409, the majority began by
noting that it characterized the fiduciary relationship as one between the fiduciary
and " 'the plan.' "211 The opinion then focused on the statutory requirement to
"'make good to such plan' " the " 'losses to the plan' " and that any profits
realized by the fiduciary be "restore[d] to such plan.' ",212 Finally, to support its
decision the majority turned to legislative history from the time of ERISA's
enactment. It emphasized that "the crucible of congressional concern was misuse
and mismanagement of plan assets by plan administrators .... ,,213 The Court's
decision, then, meant that Russell could not recover directly and individually as a
result of any fiduciary breach that had occurred.
Fiduciaries rely on some of the language in Russell to argue that plaintiffs
cannot recover under sections 502(a)(2) and 409 to individual DC plan
accounts. 214 Their logic is that the Russell decision requires relief to "inure[] to
the benefit of the plan as a whole."215 Since recoveries for fiduciary breach in a
DC plan flow to the individual accounts of participants, the relief does not benefit
the plan "as a whole." 216
207 Russell v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3203 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1984) (No. 84-9).
208 Russell, 473 U.S. at 148.
209 Id. at 140.
210Id.
211 Id. (quoting ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000)).
2 12 Id. at 140 (quoting ERISA § 409; 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000)).
213 Id. at 140 n.8.
214 Norman Stein, Enron and its Aftermath: Three and Possibly Four Lessons About
ERISA that We Should, but Probably Will Not, Learn From Enron, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 855,
873-74 (2002).
215 473 U.S. at 140.
216 Id.
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To the extent courts accept this argument, the individualized nature of DC
plans would largely immunize fiduciaries from suits for fiduciary breach. The
only other section that is available to plaintiffs seeking relief for fiduciary breach
is section 502(a)(3). But, depending on the application of current jurisprudence to
cases of fiduciary breach, it is possible that this may only rarely provide a viable
avenue of recovery. The Supreme Court has made clear that, in cases not
involving breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiffs may recover only relief typically
available in equity, including equitable restitution but not legal restitution,217
under section 502(a)(3)'s provision for "appropriate equitable relief."218 Thus,
plaintiffs may have to meet difficult standards, including showing that the
fiduciaries have been unjustly enriched, to recover for fiduciary breach under
section 502(a)(3). 219
Courts have, in a variety of situations, relied upon Russell to deny plaintiffs
the right to recover under sections 502(a)(2) and 409. For example, in Farr v. US
West, Inc.,220 Farr alleged that the plan fiduciaries had provided fraudulent
information on the tax consequences of taking a lump sum benefit from a DB
plan that was offering a window benefit. The Ninth Circuit read Russell as
meaning that: "a plan may get relief under § [409], but individual beneficiaries
generally may not."221 Farr and the other plaintiffs were seeking direct
recompense for the additional tax burden from the lump sums, or front or back
pay between the dates of their actual retirements and the date they would have
retired but for the window benefit.222 Thus, the court decided they were seeking
individualized relief and not relief that would benefit the plan as a whole and
dismissed their claim. 223 Similarly, in Cinelli v. Security Pac. Corp.,224 a retiree
sued after his former employer terminated his company-paid supplemental life
insurance. Without deciding whether the plan fiduciaries had breached their
obligations, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the claim as one that requested relief that
217 See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214-15 (2002)
(holding equitable restitution but not legal restitution to be available); Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc.,
508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (deciding that only "those categories of relief that were typically
available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory
damages)" are available).
218 ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
219 Dana M. Muir, Appropriate Equitable Relief after Great-West v. Knudson, EMPLOYEE
BENEFrS COMMirrEE NEWStErrER 2 (Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Labor and Employment Law,
Chicago, III., Fall 2002) (discussing the standards for recovery after Great-West and noting that
cases of fiduciary breach may be distinguishable).
220 58 F.3d 1361, 1363 (9th Cir. 1995), later opinion, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 38509 (9th
Cir. 1998).
221 Farr, 58 F.3d at 1364.
222 Id. at 1363.
223 Id. at 1364.
224 61 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir. 1995).
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was not available. In the words of the court: "Individual beneficiaries may bring
fiduciary actions against the plan fiduciaries, but they must do so for the benefit of
the plan and not their individual benefit."225
It becomes easy, then, to understand the arguments made by fiduciaries of
DC plans when plaintiffs seek relief to their plan accounts due to fiduciary breach.
Particularly in participant-directed plans, the relief will necessarily be
individualized if the fiduciary breach is due to selection of an inappropriate
investment vehicle, the provision of fraudulent investment advice, or some similar
action with an effect on the participant's account assets. In such instances,
individualized calculations are necessary to determine the extent of the
participant's harm. And, relief would appropriately inure to the individual
accounts of harmed participants.
The similarities with cases that have found claims to be unavailable under
sections 502(a)(b) and 409, however, are only superficial. In Russell and in each
of the cases discussed above, the plaintiffs sought relief that would be paid by the
fiduciaries to the individual plaintiffs outside the plan. And, at most, that is all
Russell held-that under sections 502(a)(2) and 409 plaintiffs could not get relief
that bypasses the plan and is paid directly from the fiduciary to them as
individuals. Instead, any payment a court orders a fiduciary to make must flow to
the plan.
An understanding of Russell that permits DC plan participants to recover for
fiduciary breach so long as the relief flows to their plan accounts comports with
the Russell majority's focus on the relationship between the fiduciary and the
plan, as opposed to the fiduciary and the plaintiff.2 26 It also is consistent with the
statutory language, which refers only to "a plan," "such plan," and "the plan"
without any indication that the relief can only be awarded to the undivided assets
held in a DB plan or to an unallocated account in a DC plan. Finally, permitting
DC plan participants to recover to their plan accounts is necessary in order to
achieve the congressional goals that the Russell Court recognized. Unless
appropriate relief is available to allow participants and beneficiaries to receive
redress for fiduciary breaches they will not be able to protect themselves from the
"misuse and mismanagement of plan assets" 227 that so concerned Congress.
It is true that in its Russell opinion, the Court twice referred to recovery under
sections 502(a)(2) and 409 as flowing to "the plan as a whole. ' 228 However, in
the first reference the Court was simply restating the petitioner's argument.229 In
the second, the Court was focused on Russell's request that compensatory and
225 Id at 1445.
226 See supra text accompanying note 211.
22 7 Russell, 473 U.S. at 140 n.8.
228 Id. at 140, 142 n.9.
229 Id. at 140.
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punitive damages be paid directly to her.230 The Court's rationale seemed to be
that relief flowing to the plan as a whole would typically be the best way to
protect participants and beneficiaries against "possible misuse of plan assets." 231
The Court went on to make an important statement about the scope of fiduciary
duties imposed by ERISA: "[T]he principal statutory duties imposed on the
trustees relate to the proper management, administration, and investment of fund
assets, the maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified information,
and the avoidance of conflicts of interest. 232
In DB plans, where plan assets are not allocated to individual participants'
accounts, monetary relief for fiduciary breach typically would flow to the plan as
a whole. In that way, losses to the plan would be redressed, assets would be
protected against misuse, and fiduciaries would be held accountable for
appropriate management, asset investment, and so forth. But, in a DC plan,
typically all or most 233 of the funds held by the plan will be held in individual
participant accounts. The only way losses to the plan can be redressed, assets can
be protected against misuse, and fiduciaries can be held accountable for
appropriate management, asset investment, and so forth is by allowing for
recoveries to individual participant accounts. Finally, this interpretation is
consistent with the statutory language, which throughout section 409 refers to "a
plan," "such plan," and "the plan," but never to "the plan as a whole." As
discussed above,234 the Supreme Court has been consistent in interpreting
ERISA's remedial provisions as they are written-without adding remedies that
are not there and without taking away remedies that are provided for under the
statute.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis in Smith v. Sydnor235 took a reasonably broad
view of the relief available to participants under sections 502(a)(2) and 409. In
Smith, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their fiduciary duties by
causing the employee stock ownership plan to sell employer securities back to the
company for an insufficient price.236 Plaintiffs sought to require the company and
an individual fiduciary to disgorge all the profits from that transaction, rescind the
purchase, and restore a put option that the plan had held to sell the employer
23 0 See id. at 142 n.9.
231 Id. at 142.
232 Id1.
233 DC plans may hold some assets that have not been allocated to individual accounts.
For example, if an unvested participant leaves the plan, that participant's account balance will
be forfeited to the plan and held in an unallocated account until it is used to pay plan expenses
or reallocated to the accounts of other participants. See CANAN, supra note 10, at § 7.10.
234 See supra Part II.D.2.
235 184 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 1999), later opinion, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20074 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 25, 2000) (deciding fiduciaries had not breached ERISA's standards).
236 Smith, 184 F.3d at 359-60.
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securities at a substantially higher price.237 In considering whether the plaintiffs
could bring an action under sections 502(a)(2) and 409, the Fourth Circuit stated:
'This remedy is precisely what ERISA § 409 provides. Although this remedy will
undoubtedly benefit Smith and other participants in the Plan, it does not solely
benefit the individual participants. ' 238 This case is not entirely on point with the
hypothetical cases of most concern in this section-cases where fiduciary
breaches cause harm to individual DC plan accounts but do not harm a suspense
account or other account containing unallocated assets239-because in Smith the
repurchase of employer stock at an inadequate price also damaged the suspense
account. But, the Fourth Circuit at least acknowledged that plaintiffs may recover
to individual plan accounts under sections 502(a)(2) and 409.
In sum, under the worst case scenario for plaintiffs in fiduciary breach cases,
ERISA jurisprudence could develop in such a way that DB plan plaintiffs are
prevented from bringing fiduciary breach cases because their interests are not
individualized enough to meet the standing requirement of injury in fact. At the
same time, DC plan plaintiffs could be prevented from bringing fiduciary breach
cases because their interests are too individualized to meet the requirements of
sections 502(a)(2) and 409. But, both of those approaches misapprehends the
nature of benefit plans and the provisions of ERISA. The statute and plans grant a
rich bundle of rights to participants in DB and DC plans. When a fiduciary breach
causes loss to a DB plan, that loss affects the DB plan pariticpants' and
beneficiaries' bundle of rights. In fact, the mere fact of fiduciary breach impinges
on the right Congress granted to plan participants and beneficiaries to be members
in a plan that is free of fiduciary malfeasance. In DC plans, fiduciary breaches that
cause loss to the plan typically cause that loss by affecting the value of individual
participants' accounts. The statute, the legislative history, and Supreme Court
precedent all are consistent with an interpretation of ERISA sections 502(a)(2)
and 409 that would permit DC plan participants to recover to their plan accounts
in such cases of fiduciary wrongdoing.
IV. AN INCREASED ROLE FOR INVESTMENT ADVICE
This Part turns to a different type of issue associated with the investment of
plan assets-the need participants who are responsible for making their own
237 Id. at 363.
2 3 8 Id.
2 39 In employee stock ownership plans, suspense accounts hold employer stock between
the time the plan sponsor contributes the stock to the plan and it is allocated to participant
accounts. For discussions of the use of suspense accounts and the issues they raise in hostile
acquisition attempts, see Steven J. Arsenault, Fiduciary Duties of ESOP Trustees Under ERISA
in Tender Offers: The Impact of Herman v. NationsBank Trust Company and a Proposal for
Reform, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 87, 93 (2000); Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing
ESOPs, 45 TAx L. REv. 363, 366-67 (1990).
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investment decisions in DC plans have for integrated investment management
services. To better ground the discussion of regulation, this Part begins with a
brief description of the various forms of investment advice and how investment
advice differs from investment education. Second, I consider a legislative
proposal intended to expand participant access to such advice. Finally, I conclude
with discussion of important factors that should inform regulatory efforts in the
investment advice arena.
A. The Case for Integrated Investment Management
Current regulation draws a sharp distinction between investment education
and investment advice. To delegate responsibility for investment selection in a
DC plan, and concurrently to avoid liability for investment selection, a plan
sponsor must provide participants with some investment education. At minimum,
participants must receive "a general description of the investment objectives and
risk and return characteristics of each such alternative, including information
relating to the type and diversification of assets comprising the portfolio of the
designated investment alternative." 240 Once the plan sponsor has delegated
investment responsibility to participants, the plan is known as a "participant-
directed plan."
Many plan sponsors offer more than the minimum required investment
education to their employees. Seminars on investment principles and on-line and
other analytic tools have become popular ways for plan sponsors to assist
employees in optimizing their DC plan investments. These programs and
techniques come at little cost to the plan and the programs can accommodate
significant numbers of employees in a group setting. Providing investment
education does not cause the plan to become a fiduciary for investment
selection-a fact that provides significant liability protection to the plan sponsor.
Compare investment advice. Investment advice differs from investment
education in that education teaches general investment principles and techniques.
Investment advice provides an individual with personalized recommendations on
which mutual funds to purchase, the amount of a specific stock to hold, and so
forth. Thus, investment advice must take into account an employee's financial
status and goals, the person's specific risk tolerance, and numerous other
individualized factors. Investment advice, then, cannot be provided in a mass
forum or through the use of generic materials. This makes investment advice
much more expensive than investment education for plans that may choose to
offer advice. And, investment advice is a fiduciary function. As such, it is subject
to ERISA's fiduciary standards, including prudence and loyalty. Furthermore, if a
plan sponsor chooses to hire an outside investment advisor rather than the sponsor
providing the advice directly, the selection and monitoring of the outside advisor
240 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404(c)-l(b)(2)(B)(1)(ii) (1992).
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to provide advice is a fiduciary function. Those who have discretionary decision-
making authority over the selection will be subject to ERISA's fiduciary
standards.
Whether it is because of the cost of the programs, their complexity, the
potential legal liability, or for some combination of these factors, far fewer plans
offer employees investment advice than offer investment education. On the other
hand, studies consistently show that not only do employees want investment
advice, they want full service advice. They do not want to be taught how to
choose their investments. They do not even particularly want to be told what
investments to make. Instead, they want someone to make the investment
decisions and complete all of the necessary administrative steps to complete the
transactions. In industry parlance, employees want "do it for me" service. In this
Article, I will refer to the combination of services that includes both decision
making on asset allocation and administrative implementation as integrated
investment management services.
One legitimate question is whether responding to employees' stated desire for
access to integrated investment management would serve any function other than
increasing employee satisfaction. The question is not meant to minimize the
importance of employee satisfaction with their benefit plans. Rather, it is intended
as a way to surface a variety of issues associated with investments in participant-
directed accounts. Approaching the question from this perspective brings to light
two other possible rationales for integrated investment management. First,
increased access to professional advice should reduce the incoherent decision-
making that appears to occur not infrequently when plan participants make their
own investment decisions. Second, integrated investment management should
effectively address those situations, which research finds to be quite prevalent,
where participants make an investment decision but do not follow through by
taking the necessary administrative steps to implement the decision.
On the first point, I have written elsewhere at some length,241 about
behavioral economics research and empirical data that show participant decision
making does not seem to optimize investment returns even given various levels of
risk tolerance. To briefly summarize, participants spend little time considering
their initial investment allocations and consider only a limited amount of
material.242 And, once they have made their initial allocation decision,
participants tend not to modify that decision or rebalance their plan portfolios
even in response to changing personal or market factors. 243 Participants also
241 See Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and Investment
Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 11-18
(2002).
242 Id. at 14.
243 See Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress' Misguided Decision to
Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CoRNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 361,
376(2002).
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appear to be unreasonably loss averse. 244 On the other hand, they have a tendency
to allocate assets evenly across the available investment vehicles regardless of the
relationship between the available choices and their risk tolerance. 245 Other
research indicates that when the range of choices becomes too large to reasonably
approach in this way, participants actually tend not to be able to make any choice
at all.246 As the number of funds offered increases, plan participation rates
decrease so that plans with two funds have average participation rates of seventy-
five percent whereas plans with sixty funds have participation rates of
approximately sixty percent.247 Participants also, contrary to common sense, are
more likely to purchase employer stock with their discretionary contributions in a
plan where the employer's match is in employer stock than in a plan where the
employer's match is not automatically invested in employer stock.248
Second, research indicates that participants who take part in investment
education programs or who receive investment advice may decide to make
portfolio changes as a result of that education or advice. However, substantial
numbers of participants never follow through and actually take the administrative
steps necessary to implement the change. 249 Assuming that participants' reported
intent to make changes reflects informed decisions made utilizing educational
principles or advice, this tendency to inertia appears suboptimal. The inertia also
indicates that expenditures on education and advice are not resulting in maximum
value to participants. After all, a participant who becomes more financially
sophisticated and who can make better investment decisions as a result of
education, will not retire with any additional assets as a result of that education if
the knowledge and decisions never translate into actual investment allocations.
In sum, substantial evidence exists that integrated investment management
could enhance investment returns in participant-directed DC plan accounts and
that numerous participants want such a service. By offering integrated investment
management, a plan sponsor may enhance participant satisfaction with the plan.
244 Muir, supra note 241, at 13.
245 Id. at 13-14.
246 Sheena S. Iyengar et al., How Much Choice is Too Much?: Determinants of Individual
Contributions In 401(k) Retirement Plans, The Pension Research Council 2003 Conference
Notebook 37, 40-42 (2003).
247 Id. at 40.
248 Muir, supra note 241, at 15-16.
249 See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral
Economics to Increase Employee Saving, The Pension Research Council 2003 Conference
Notebook 76, 77 (2003) (citing research on intended, but unrealized, increases in plan savings
rates); Jason Scott & Greg Stein, Retirement Security in a DC World. Effectively Bridging the
Expertise Gap 16-20 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with this author) (discussing
tables showing the effect that immediate and simplified implementation has on adoption of
advice).
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And, professional management could overcome both the inertia and the
incoherent nature of investment allocations made by participants.
B. Proposed Regulatory Measures to Encourage Investment Advice
In May 2003, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1000, known as the
Pension Security Act of 2003 (Pension Security Act).250 Among other things, that
Act intends to "promote the provision of retirement investment advice to workers
managing their retirement income assets. '251 As this Article is being written, the
bill is awaiting attention by the Senate where it faces significant opposition.252
The 106th and 107th Congresses both considered similar bills, with an earlier
version, H.R. 2269, passing the House of Representatives but not the Senate.253
The focus of the Pension Security Act's provisions on investment advice is
apparent from the title of the applicable section of the bill: "Prohibited
Transaction Exemption for the Provision of Investment Advice."2 54 Currently, the
prohibited transaction provisions of ERISA and the IRC preclude entities that
provide services to benefit plans or to plan sponsors from also providing
investment advice for a fee. 255 So, for example, the outside service provider that
is the primary contact for plan participants, the record-keeper, or the provider of
the plan's mutual funds cannot provide investment advice for a fee unless the
provider obtains an exemption from the DOL or shapes its provision of
investment advice to fit an approach the DOL has approved. The Pension
Security Act, in contrast, would permit service providers, who have an existing
business relationship with a plan, to provide investment advice so long as the
provider complies with detailed disclosure obligations intended to make plan
participants aware of the provider's conflicts of interest.2 56 As a result, the
Pension Security Act would remove one of the largest barriers to the provision of
investment advice.
The key decision maker, however, in whether a plan offers investment advice
tends to be the plan sponsor. Jurisprudence makes clear that plan sponsors do not
have any fiduciary obligations under ERISA when establishing or amending the
terms of a benefit plan.257 As a result, if a plan sponsor chooses not to offer
2 50 David Leonhardt, House Passes Bill to Loosen 401(k) Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2003, at C 1.
251 H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. Pmbl. (2003).
252 Leonhardt, supra note 250, at C1.
253 See id.; Muir, supra note 241, at 44-45.
254 H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. § 105 (2003).
255 Muir, supra note 241, at 35-36.
256 H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. § 105(a) (2003).
257 See Dana M. Muir, The Plan Amendment Trilogy: Settling the Scope of the Settlor
Doctrine, 15 LAB. LAW. 205, 205-07 (1999) (discussing the settlor doctrine for plan
amendments).
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investment advice through its DC plan, the plan sponsor will not have breached
any obligation to the plan participants even though investment advice might
benefit those participants. As noted above,258 however, a plan sponsor that does
offer investment advice currently assumes fiduciary responsibility for the
selection and monitoring of the investment advisor. In addition, the plan sponsor
may be liable as a co-fiduciary for any fiduciary breach committed by the
investment advisor, and may even risk the protections typically associated with a
participant-directed plan if the investment advisor fails to comply with the
regulatory standards.259 The potential liability associated with investment advice
likely is one reason plan sponsors hesitate to offer investment advice through their
DC plans.
The Pension Security Act would address, in a limited way, these barriers to
plan sponsors' adoptions of investment advice programs. The Act would protect
plan sponsors from co-fiduciary liability if the adviser breaches its fiduciary
obligations so long as the advice was provided in accordance with a formal
arrangement, the terms of the arrangement required fiduciary compliance by the
adviser, and the adviser acknowledged its role as an ERISA fiduciary. 260 On the
other hand, the Act would maintain the plan sponsor's obligations to select and
monitor investment advisers in accordance with ERISA's fiduciary standards. 261
The Act elucidates on these obligations to only a limited extent by stating that:
"The plan sponsor or other person who is a fiduciary has no duty under this part
to monitor the specific investment advice given by the fiduciary adviser to any
particular recipient of the advice." 262 This provides only limited comfort to plan
sponsors and individual fiduciaries who are employees of plan sponsors because
it leaves unresolved the difficult question of what a fiduciary must do to
adequately monitor the provision of investment advice. The substantive and
procedural standards for selecting service providers such as record keepers and
investment vehicles should provide useful guides for the fiduciary selection of an
investment adviser. However, it is unclear how fiduciaries should monitor
investment advice given the individualized nature of advice. The Retirement
Security Act does not provide any guidance on this, nor does it address whether
improper advice could void the protections of participant-directed account plans.
As a result, even if the Retirement Security Act is enacted, plan sponsors may
remain reluctant to accept the potential for liability that results from offering
investment advice through their DC plans.
25 8 See supra text accompanying note 240.
259 Muir, supra note 241, at 23.
260 H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. § 105 (2003).
261 Id.
262 1I.
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C. Considerations for the Regulation of Investment Advice
In this Section I will briefly outline a proposal to increase the predictability of
a plan sponsor's obligations in the selection and monitoring of investment
advisers. I also will offer two suggestions targeted at specific areas in which
integrated investment management may be particularly valuable. The first is the
question of whether ERISA should limit the amount of employer stock that plan
participants may hold in their DC plan accounts. The second suggestion is
targeted at the question of what government agency can most efficiently and
effectively regulate investment advisers.
Elsewhere I proposed a nonexclusive safe harbor to protect plan sponsors in
their monitoring of advice providers.263 The Advisers Act requires investment
advisers with $25 million or more under management to register with the SEC
and, concomitantly requires advisers with less than $25 million under
management to register with the states.264 I suggest that a plan fiduciary be
protected from selection and monitoring liability so long as the plan offers at least
two choices of investment advisory firms and the plan fiduciary believes in good
faith at the time it selects firms that the firms are registered with the SEC. Finally,
the plan fiduciary must, on an annual basis, engage in a review sufficient to
maintain a good faith belief that the investment advisory firms remain federally
registered.265
1. Investments in Employer Stock
I propose here that integrated investment management services be used to
address the controversy over employer stock in DC plans. Commentators have
suggested that ERISA should cap the amount of employer stock that individual
employees can hold in their DC plan accounts. For example, Professor Stabile
proposed that the maximum amount be set at ten percent.266 Similarly, multiple
bills have been introduced in congress to set limits on employer stock ownership
in participant-directed DC plans.267
The issue that these proposals address is an important one. As explained
earlier,268 patterns of participant behavior show that their investment decisions on
holding employer stock in their DC plan accounts are not rational. Furthermore, at
263 Muir, supra note 241, at 51-54.
264 James H. Walsh, Federal Regulation of Financial Planners After the Investment
Advisers Supervision Coordination Act, 10 DEPAULBus. L.J. 259, 282-83 (1998).
265 Muir, supra note 241, at 51.
266 Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities: More is not Always
Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 88 (1998).
267 H.R. 3692, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 1838, 107th Cong. (2001).
268 Supra text accompanying notes 241-48.
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one time the theory that people dramatically under diversify when they invest
their human capital and financial capital in the same enterprise seemed primarily
that-a logical-sounding financial theory. However, the corporate scandals and
dot corn failures of the past few years turned this theory into reality for far too
many loyal employees. The press has been filled with accounts of people not only
losing their jobs, but also losing nearly all of their retirement savings where they
had invested heavily in stock of their employer. Nor have losses of this sort been
limited to corporations embroiled in scandal and dot coms. During the recent
years of a declining stock market and corporate downsizing, employees of a wide
array of companies have faced job loss or declines in the value of the company
stock they hold in their retirement accounts. And, there too, the most negatively
affected may be those who lost both jobs and significant portions of their DC plan
assets.
The commentators and legislators who would prevent reoccurrences of these
losses by capping employer stock ownership often cite parallel regulation of DB
plans as support for their approach.269 ERISA does cap a DB plan's ownership of
plan sponsor stock at ten percent of the DB plan's assets.270 However, the
rationale for limiting a plan sponsor's purchase of its own stock in a DB plan is
quite different from the reasons underlying the suggested DB plan caps,
particularly, as those caps would affect participants' discretionary investment
decisions. When making investment decisions in a DB plan, whether those
investments are in employer stock or any other investment vehicle, plan sponsors
and the responsible investment committee act as fiduciaries. 271 In addition to its
general fiduciary provisions, ERISA sets out prohibited transactions, which
literally prohibit transactions in certain categories, regardless of fairness to the
plan.272
Transactions of these types were thought to pose such a risk to plans that they
should be explicitly banned. The harm that the provisions target is the plan
sponsor's self-interest in choosing its own stock as a DB plan investment. This
self-interest encompasses not only an ability to support the stock's price through
increased demand, but also the placement of a potentially large block of stock in
friendly hands. A DB plan's ownership of employer stock can be useful in
fending off a hostile attempt to purchase the company or adverse shareholder
proposals.273
269 See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 266, at 88.
270 ERISA § 407, 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (2000). The statute also imposes limitations, in some
narrow circumstances, on the amount of employer stock that may be held in DC plans. ERISA
§ 407(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(b)(2) (2000).
271 See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
272 ERISA § 406,29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2000).
273 ERISA's fiduciary provisions do limit the extent to which a plan sponsor can utilize
the employer stock held by a DB plan for the benefit of the employee. See, e.g., Donovan v.
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In contrast, this rationale of constraining self-interest has little place in
participant-directed DC plans. So long as there is no explicit or implicit pressure
from the employer regarding investments in employer securities, individual
participants simply do not face a conflict of interest when deciding whether to
invest in those securities. Instead, at least in theory, their investment allocation
decisions would be made with the intent of maximizing their ultimate retirement
assets.
Although participants do not have a conflict of interest in deciding whether to
invest in employer stock, it is important to ask whether any other reasons exist
that might cause participants to make suboptimal investment decisions regarding
employer stock. Two such reasons can be identified. First, the prior paragraph
noted the possibility of explicit or implicit employer pressure. Given power and
information differences between employees and employers it would not be
unexpected that some employers might use subtle, or not so subtle, measures to
encourage employees to purchase employer stock. It is even possible that
employees would perceive implicit pressure in communications that the company
intends as nothing more than morale building. This type of investment problem is
unique to employer stock and unlikely to be replicated in the selection of other
investment vehicles. Second, employees may simply make the kinds of
investment mistakes identified by behavioral economics research. Their
discretionary purchases of employer stock where the employer match is made in
employer stock may reflect confirmation bias.274 Or, their pro rata allocation of
assets to employer stock in a plan with a small number of investment alternatives
may result from use of the 1/n heuristic. 275 These types of errors may or may not
be unique to employer stock.
So, participants may over invest in employer stock as a result of suboptimal
decision making. At least some of the influences that contribute to such over
investment are attributable to employer actions-implicit or explicit pressure to
purchase employer stock or making matching contributions in employer stock. As
a result, it may make policy sense to consider legislative or regulatory action to
address these problems that lead to inefficient participant decision-making.
However, the commentators and legislators who would arbitrarily cap employee
investment in employer stock at a set level regardless of the company's economic
prospects, the employees' individual financial situations, and other relevant
factors do not seem to have chosen the best approach.
Arbitrary caps would preclude employees who would rationally, given their
risk tolerances and individual circumstances, choose to invest heavily in securities
of their employer from doing so. At least in that way, the caps would be
Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982) (deciding in a hostile takeover attempt that the plan
fiduciaries must make decisions about the plan's investment in employer securities "with an eye
single to the interests of participants and beneficiaries.").
274 Muir, supra note 241, at 15-16.
275 Id. at 13-14.
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economically inefficient and may actually lower investment returns for
employees. The caps also would further increase the differential between upper
management employees, who often have access to stock option plans and other
favorable ways of investing in their firms, and lower level employees who would
be limited in their ability to use tax-incented programs to invest in their
employers.
Instead of arbitrary caps, I propose that integrated investment management
services could effectively address many of the factors that lead to inefficient over-
investment in employer stock. Plan sponsors that wish to offer employer stock as
a discretionary investment in DC plans should be required to provide integrated
investment management services through the plan. In addition, any plan sponsor
that wants to make matching contributions in employer stock should be required
to provide participants with an opportunity to diversify out of employer stock
after a reasonable period 276 and provide integrated investment management
services through the plan. This would ensure that employees at least have the
opportunity to receive professional advice regarding their investments in
employer securities. It also would address the more general issues of participant
inertia and incoherent decision making, which seems to occur across the broad
range of investment vehicles.
Two criticisms might be made against this proposal. First, and most seriously,
opponents may question whether integrated investment management services
arranged for by a plan sponsor and offered through a plan could possibly be free
of conflicts of interest in favor of the employer who selects the investment
management firm. This is a fair point. There are, however, multiple ways by
which my proposal and existing legislation work to negate this type of conflict.
First, under my proposal, each benefit plan offers at least two investment advisers.
The competitive position of the advisers should work to ensure their loyalty to
their participant clients. Second, the advisers would be subjected to ERISA's
fiduciary standards. Their recommendations and actions, including with respect to
company stock, would have to be made in the best interest of the individual
participant clients and meet the prudence requirement.277 Thus, constraints would
exist to prevent advisers from recommending investments in employer stock in an
attempt to curry favor with plan sponsors at the expense of participants.
Another potential criticism is that the proposal only requires a plan to offer
integrated investment management services if the plan includes employer stock as
276 See, e.g., H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. (2003) (requiring plans to permit diversification out
of employer stock after 3 years).
277 See supra text accompanying notes 124-25. For the fiduciary standards to be effective,
ERISA must impose sufficient liability for fiduciary breach to discourage breaches and to
redress them when they do occur. Whether ERISA's remedial provisions are sufficient for those
tasks was, in large part, the focus of Parts I and l of this Article. See also, Muir, supra note
241, at 38-40 (discussing the potential lack of appropriate remedies to redress incompetent or
fraudulent investment advice).
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an investment vehicle. This means that the approximately 55% of plans that do
not include employer stock as an investment vehicle278 would not be required to
provide integrated investment management services. Participants in those plans
would not necessarily have access to services that could enhance their investment
returns. Again, the point is a fair one. However, research and financial theory
shows that employer stock poses risks in excess of those posed by other classes of
investment vehicles.279 Thus, the advice and administrative follow through of
professional investment advisers is especially important for participants who have
to decide whether or not to invest in employer stock. The proposal does not,
however, discourage other plans from providing some type of investment advice.
On the contrary, by providing increased protection from liability for plan sponsors
that meet the terms of the nonexclusive safe harbor, my proposal aims to increase
the likelihood that plan sponsors will elect to offer investment advice.
2. Regulating Integrated Investment Advice Services
As integrated investment advice services become more prevalent, it will
become important to consider whether the regulatory framework should be
adjusted. Currently, the DOL and the IRS share regulatory authority over
employee benefit plans sponsored by private employers.280 The PBGC also has
some responsibility, particularly over DB insurance premiums, plan terminations,
and multiemployer plans.281 The Pension Security Act would continue this
pattern of regulation by delegating authority to the DOL to promulgate rules for
and oversee the provisions of disclosures on conflicts of interest by investment
advisers who provide advice to plan participants and beneficiaries. 282
The DOL, however, is not necessarily the best choice to regulate issues
primarily associated with investment advice. The agency certainly has
considerable expertise with an array of employee benefit plan regulation. And, the
DOL has been active and largely effective in enforcing ERISA's fiduciary
standards as applied to plan sponsors and plan service providers. 283
The regulation of investment advisers, though, raises some unique issues. All
advisers must comply with the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.284 The SEC has
primary regulatory authority for that Act. And, as noted above,285 investment
advisers with $25 million or more in assets under management must register with
278 Holden & VanDerhei, supra note 4, at 3.
279 See supra text accompanying notes 241-48.
280 Muir, supra note 9, at 1038.
281 See id.
28 2 H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. § 105 (2003).
28 3 See supra text accompanying note 65.
284 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-18a (2000).
285 See supra text accompanying note 264.
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the SEC.286 As a result, the SEC has developed considerable expertise in
investment advice issues. It also is able to integrate its regulation of advisers with
its regulation of other securities industry participants.
In recent years the SEC has been actively updating its regulation of
investment advisers. In 2001, it began a program of mandatory electronic
reporting for the advisers who must register with the SEC.287 At that time, the
agency also proposed comprehensive revisions to Part H1 of the registration
form.288 That section sets forth the disclosures that must be made to the SEC and
on an individual basis to clients regarding conflicts of interest. 289 The proposed
revisions engendered so much controversy that the SEC shelved the proposal and
has not yet returned to it.290
Because of its existing expertise and recent efforts on disclosure, the SEC is
the logical agency to regulate investment advisers and set their disclosure
requirements whether the advisers are providing advice on assets held inside or
outside a qualified plan. Delegating the authority to the SEC would be most
efficient from the perspectives of deployment of agency assets, the level of
compliance costs imposed on the advisory industry, and the education of
investors in understanding conflicts of interest and other disclosures.
From an agency perspective, if DOL were to receive regulatory authority, as
proposed by the Pension Security Act, over advisory disclosures when advice is
given on the investment of DC plan assets, DOL would at the very least want to
coordinate its regulation with the SEC. But, having each agency develop internal
expertise over the provision of investment advice would be an inefficient use of
federal resources. Inefficiencies would multiply with the need to coordinate
regulation and enforcement.
From the perspective of investment advisers, it would be inefficient to have to
comply with different regulations promulgated by different federal agencies
depending on whether the adviser is providing advice on assets held inside or
outside a DC plan account. An adviser must take into account a client's full
financial status when determining portfolio allocations. This means that typically
an adviser would have to provide two sets of disclosures to the same client-one
set for the client's plan assets and one set for assets held outside the plan.
Presumably advisers would be subject to audits and enforcement actions by both
2 8 6 See Walsh, supra note 264, at 281-83.
287 Electronic Filing by Investment Advisers; Amendments to Form ADV, Advisers Act
Release No. [A-1897, 73 S.E.C. Docket 595 (Sept. 12, 2000).
288 Electronic Filing by Investment Advisers; Proposed Amendments to Form ADV,
Advisers Act Release No. IA-1862, 72 S.E.C. Docket 200 (Apr. 5, 2000).
289 Form ADV is available on the SEC's web site at: http://www.sec.gov/pdf
/fadvpapr.pdf.
290 See Electronic Filing by Investment Advisers; Amendments to Form ADV, Advisers
Act Release No. IA-1897, 73 S.E.C. Docket 595 (Sept. 12, 2000).
[Vol. 65:199
ERISA AND INVESTMENT ISSUES
the SEC and the DOL. A bifurcated regulatory system of this type could only add
to the compliance costs of advisers, costs that would ultimately be borne by plan
sponsors, plan participants, or individual investors outside benefit plans.
The inefficiencies that a bifurcated system would impose on the agencies and
advisers might be justified if the costs are offset by advantages to plan participants
and non-plan investors. However, not only is it hard to envision that happening, it
seems likely that participants and non-plan investors also would be burdened by
such a system of regulation. As just discussed, it is likely that investment advisers
would pass along the increased costs of such a regulatory regime to their clients.
That would burden all individual investors, whether or not they participate in a
DC plan that provides investment advice. Similarly, the increased costs that result
from replicating expertise in regulation and enforcement at the DOL and the SEC
would be borne by taxpayers.
Plan participants who receive advice on both plan assets and non-plan assets
would receive two different sets of disclosures-one for each category of assets.
It is difficult to imagine why two sets of disclosures would be other than
confusing to participants. Some might argue that advisers that have business
relationships with plans or plan sponsors have different conflicts of interest
because of those relationships. The argument is that this would require disclosures
about those conflicts when the adviser is giving advice to the participants about
investment of plan assets. But, this logic is flawed. Here, too, the participants
would benefit from one set of disclosures. The participants need to be aware that
the adviser's relationship with the plan or plan sponsor poses a risk of tainted
advice on both plan and non-plan assets. After all, under the logic of bifurcated
disclosure and regulation, an adviser could disclose a plan-related conflict with
respect only to plan assets and avoid giving tainted advice regarding those assets.
But, if the adviser provides advice on non-plan assets in a way that benefits its
business relationships with the plan or plan sponsor, the participant still gets
tainted advice.
V. CONCLUSION
If Americans are to enjoy retirements free of severe financial worries in the
21 st century, then the pension plans sponsored by private employers must contain
sufficient assets to provide expected and needed benefits. ERISA's fiduciary and
remedial provisions are critical in ensuring that the assets in DB plans are not
squandered by careless or criminal fiduciaries. Those same provisions also protect
the assets in DC plans. No significant amendments to either ERISA's fiduciary
provisions or its remedial provisions have been enacted since the passage of the
statute in 1974. Depending upon the way jurisprudence develops, however,
reforms in these provisions may become vital to ensure appropriate protection of
plan assets. In the context of the investment of plan assets, fiduciaries of
overfunded DB plans should not be given a free pass for fiduciary violations. Nor
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should participants in DC plans be left without adequate remedies to address
violations by plan sponsors or any kind of plan service provider.
In addition, it appears that participants and beneficiaries in DC plans want
and need help in making investment decisions so that over the course of their
lifespan they do not move from being YUPPIES to Grossly Under Prepared
Persons (GUPPIES). 291 But, the regulation of the provision of advice needs to
consider the complex web of interests-some of which contain significant
conflicts of interest-of plan sponsors, advice providers and participants. It also
should recognize the SEC's expertise in this arena and avoid duplicate regulation
that would be costly and confusing to both the industry and investors. Finally, it
must deal with the unique issues presented by investments in employer stock.
291 Dana M. Muir, From YUPPIES to GUPPIES: Unfunded Mandates and Benefit Plan
Regulation, 34 GA. L. REV. 195, 195 n.2 (1999) (defining GUPPIES).
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